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Burying the Ghosts of a Complainant’s Sexual Past: The 
Constitutional Debates Surrounding Section 227 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977 
 
1. Introduction 
 
“It has been said that the victim of a sexual assault is actually assaulted twice- 
once by the offender and once by the criminal justice system.”1 
 
South Africa’s rape shield provision is contained in section 227 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act.2 The purpose of its enactment is to protect a complainant in a 
sexual offence matter from secondary victimisation during the trial as far as 
possible, by restricting the type of evidence that is admissible and the 
circumstances under which such evidence can be found to be admissible. 
 
This rationale has come under attack for its effect on the fair trial rights of the 
accused. There has been no challenge to the constitutionality of section 227 
before a court yet. However, there are numerous rumblings of discontent at 
the consequences of a provision that restricts evidence that could be 
necessary to prevent a wrongful conviction. 
 
This paper seeks to consider the constitutional debates surrounding section 
227 and to determine whether, to the extent that they may prove to be 
constitutionally problematic, the potential constitutional challenges are 
justifiable under a limitations analysis. 
 
It is impossible to engage with the constitutionality of section 227 without first 
discussing the rationale behind rape shield laws in general. The structure of 
the paper is therefore as follows: firstly, the history and purpose of rape shield 
laws will be investigated, and secondly, the history of section 227 under South 
African law will be discussed. 
                                                 
1 State v Sheline, 955 S.W. 2d 42, 44 (Tenn. 1997). 
2 Act 51 of 1977. 
 4 
The paper will then move from these preliminary questions, to an outline of 
the constitutional challenges that are levelled against section 227. In order to 
adequately determine the constitutionality, or otherwise, of section 227, it is 
necessary to determine the scope of the accused’s constitutional right to a fair 
trial. Thereafter, an in-depth interpretation exercise of section 227 will be 
conducted. Finally, a limitations analysis under section 36 will be followed, to 
determine whether the constitutional challenges levelled at section 227 are 
“reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society based on 
human dignity, equality and freedom”. 
 
The paper will often make use of gender-specific language. The reason for 
this is two-fold. Firstly, it is necessary for ease of writing. Secondly, and more 
importantly, in the past only women could be raped, and at present the 
majority of sexual offence complainants remain women. The paper therefore 
takes cognisance of this fact and will sometimes refer to the effect on ‘women’ 
rather than on complainants in general. However, the paper does not exclude 
the possibility that a complainant may be male. 
 
 
2. Rape Shield Laws 
 
2.1. The History of Rape Shield Laws 
 
English law adopted the ancient law requirement that a female had to be a 
virgin otherwise raping her would not be considered illegal conduct.3 English 
colonies took on the law of England, and therefore many countries in the 
world have a legal history that differentiated between the rape of a virgin and 
the rape of a non-virgin.4 In South Africa, these evidentiary rules were 
adopted from the English law of evidence into the South African common law. 
                                                 
3 Michelle J Anderson From Chastity Requirement to Sexuality Licence: Sexual Consent and a New 
Rape Shield Law (2002) George Washington Law Review 70 at 60. 
4 Anderson (note 3) at 61. The punishment for the rape of a virgin was having the man’s eyes and 
testicles removed; and the punishment for the rape of non-virgins was corporal punishment.  
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The law traditionally endorsed the view that the sexual history of a woman 
who laid a charge of rape was relevant to the truth of the allegation.5 The 
rationale for these rules was that no decent woman engaged in sexual 
intercourse outside of marriage.6 
 
Although lack of chastity was not in itself a defence to a charge of rape, a 
woman’s chastity, or lack thereof pointed to two issues, namely, credibility and 
consent.7 A woman who had previously engaged in sexual intercourse was 
considered unchaste. Further, such an unchaste woman was believed to 
more likely have willingly agreed to sexual intercourse with the accused, and 
to have lied afterwards about it.8 Thus, accusing a woman of lack of consent 
was an effective functional defence.9 
 
“Since want of consent on the part of the complainant is of the essence 
of the crime of forcible rape . . , it is permissible, in order to show the 
probability of consent by the prosecutrix, that her general reputation for 
immorality and unchastity be shown. The underlying thought here is 
that it is more probable that an unchaste woman would assent to such 
an act than a virtuous woman.”10 
 
It is clear that embedded within the law was the requirement that women had 
to abstain from sexual conduct in order to gain access to the protection of the 
law.11 Anderson calls this command the law’s “chastity requirement”.12 She 
argues that the chastity requirement derived from the distorted view that 
                                                 
5 JRL Milton South African Criminal Law and Procedure 2nd ed. (1982) at 441. Anderson (note 3) at 
52. 
6 PJ Schwikkard “Matters Pertaining to Evidence” (Chapter 23) in Dee Smythe at al Commentary to the 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Act 32 of 2007 (unpublished) at 23-12. PJ 
Schwikkard ‘Getting Somewhere Slowly – The Revision of a Few Evidence Rules’ in Lillian Artz and 
Dee Smythe Should We Consent? Rape Law Reform in South Africa (2008) at 95.  
7 Victoria Bronstein The Rape Complainant in Court: An Analysis of Legal Discourse (1994) Acta 
Juridica 202 at 214. 
8 Thea Illsley Sexual History Evidence in South Africa: A Comparative Enquiry (2002) 15 South 
African Journal of Criminal Justice 15 at 228. Anderson (note 3) at 53. 
9 Anderson (note 3) at 77. 
10 People v. Collins, 186 N.E.2d 30 (Ill. 1962) at 33. 
11 Susan Edwards Female Sexuality and the Law (1981) at 70. 
12 Anderson (note 3) at 53. 
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consent to sexual intercourse lacked temporal constraints, could be imprecise 
as to act and was transferable to other people.13 
 
Historically, a husband could not be accused of rape, because the act of 
marriage meant that a woman was legally submitting to her husband’s sexual 
advances for the duration of their marriage.14 Even where there was no 
marital relationship, prior sexual intercourse with the defendant was 
considered sufficient indication of consent to the intercourse presently in 
dispute. 
 
Consent was also thought to be imprecise as to the nature of the act as non-
penetrative sexual conduct with a particular man was understood to imply 
consent to sexual intercourse with him as well. Consent was also considered 
transferable. Where a woman had previously consented to intercourse with 
other men, her consent lost its unique nature and she was considered 
indiscriminate in her sex life. Therefore she had functionally consented to 
intercourse with the defendant.15 
 
In the United States of America, the Woman’s Movement flourished in the 
1970s. As a result, legislators were forced to re-examine the so-called chastity 
requirement.16 Legislatures began imposing rape shield laws to restrict the 
admission of rape complainants’ sexual histories.17 The first rape shield law 
was passed by the state of Michigan in 1974. By the early 1980s, many states 
in the United States had enacted some form of rape shield law. South Africa 
legislated for its first rape shield law in 1989, where the previous common law 
rules first met legislative challenge.18 Rape shield laws now exist in many 
jurisdictions throughout the world.19 
 
                                                 
13 Anderson (note 3) at 53. 
14 Joanne Fedler et al ‘Beyond the Facelift: The Legal System’s Need for a Change of Heart’ in Yoon 
Jung Park et al South Africa (2000) at 130. 
15 Anderson (note 3) at 54. 
16 Anderson (note 3) at 80.  
17 Catherine L Kello Rape Shield Laws – Is it Time for Reinforcement? (1987-1988) University of 
Michigan Journal of Law Reform 21 at 317. 
18 The full history of rape shield laws in South Africa will be discussed below. 
19 Inter alia, Canada, Australia, New Zealand, England. 
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2.2. The Purpose of Rape Shield Laws 
 
The myths relating to rape and gender are inextricably bound within the legal 
system. This is evidenced from the way laws are drafted, and more 
poignantly, by the way they are implemented by judicial officers. Research 
has shown that there is a relation between the acceptance of rape myths and 
other forms of prejudice, such as sexism, racism and religious intolerance, 
and that all these constructs are connected as part of a unitary belief 
system.20 Stereotypical beliefs about victims can affect the judgment of those 
involved in decision-making at different stages of the criminal justice 
process.21 Rape myths are prejudicial, and people who believe rape myths 
are more likely to attribute blame to the victim, holding that she could have 
avoided the incident by modifying her own behaviour.22 
 
Even where rape shield laws do exist, they are often not properly 
implemented, or are ignored. The nature of sexual offences is such that they 
often occur in private. When the word of one person is set against the other, 
there may not always be sufficient evidence or law to point to a clear verdict. 
Other factors, such as credibility, will then become more important in 
determining the truth. Character evidence often plays a huge role, and could 
be the deciding factor of a decision. The danger is that lifestyle choices are 
attributed to whether there was consent in a particular case or not.23 The 
successful prosecution of sexual offences is continually barred by these rape 
myths, particularly those related to the promiscuity of women.24 
 
Unfortunately, once character and prior sexual history evidence is admitted, 
there is very little that can be done to prevent negative inferences being 
drawn from it. Rape shield laws are therefore intended to mitigate the chastity 
                                                 
20 Allyson K Clarke and Karen L Lawson Women’s Judgments of a Sexual Assault Scenario: The Role 
of Prejudicial Attitudes and Victim Weight (2009) Violence and Victims 24(2) at 250. 
21 Jennifer Temkin and Barbara Krahe Sexual Assault and the Justice Gap: A Question of Attitude 
(2009) at 31. 
22 Clarke and Lawson (note 20) at 249. 
23 Myrna S Raeder Litigating Sex Crimes in the United States: Has the Last Decade Made Any 
Difference? (2009) International Commentary on Evidence 6(2) at 12. 
24 Raeder (note 23) at 14. 
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requirement.25 When evidence of prior sexual history is admitted, collateral 
issues may become the central focus of the trial and there is the danger of 
misuse of the evidence.26 Rape shield laws thus seek to prevent the prior 
sexual history being admitted as evidence at all. 
 
The primary purpose of rape shield laws is to protect a woman from allowing 
her sexual reputation or behaviour from being used to reduce her credibility or 
infer that in all probability she had consented to the sexual conduct. These 
inferences are based on historical prejudices of women, and do not actually 
assist with the fact-finding role of the court. At its essence then, rape shield 
laws endeavour to protect the very truth-seeking process itself.27 
 
Moreover, it is argued that cross-examination of a sexual offence 
complainant, besides aiding in the traumatisation and humiliation of the victim, 
does not illicit any relevant evidence.28 At most it establishes a propensity to 
have sexual intercourse.29 There is no reason why this evidence ought to be 
admitted as relevant in sexual offences, since propensity evidence in other 
cases is considered inadmissible.30 Furthermore, it is unfounded that a 
woman’s reputation for a propensity to consent can show that she will 
consistently consent to sexual intercourse with other persons in other 
situations.31 
 
Although many people take objection to it, rape shield laws are also aimed at 
limiting the discretion of judicial officers. Discretion allowed to presiding 
officers can be dangerous in an area of the law where intuitions and social 
                                                 
25 Michelle J Anderson Understanding Rape Shield Laws. Violence Against Women Net (2004). 
http://www.naesv.org/Resources/Articles/UnderstandingRapeShieldLaws.pdf (accessed at 20-10-2010, 
13:00). 
26 Stephen J Odgers Evidence of Sexual History in Sexual Offence Trials Sydney 11 Law Review 
(1986-1988) at 76.  
27 People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P. 2d 275 (1978). Anderson (note 3) at 104. 
28 South African Law Commission Project 45: Women and Sexual Offences in South Africa, April 
1985. PJ Schwikkard The Evidence of Sexual Complainants and the Demise of the 2004 Criminal 
Procedure Act (2009) Namibia Law Journal 1(1) at 22. 
29 Sexual Offences Commentary (note 6) at 23-12. 
30 Schwikkard in Artz and Smythe (note 6) at 95. PJ Schwikkard “A Critical Overview of the Rules of 
Evidence Relevant to Rape Trials in South African Law” in Saras Jagwanath et al Women and the Law 
(1994) at 204. 
31 Odgers (note 26) at 81. 
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prejudices are biased against women and critical of their sexual autonomy.32 
Further, it is clear from case law that judges often do not properly exercise 
discretion to reject irrelevant character evidence of the complainant.33 
 
In sexual offence cases, particularly those in which consent is in dispute, the 
role that defence attorneys take on is to divert attention from the alleged 
offence in question and attempt to show that the complainant had provoked 
the sexual acts by the way she was dressed, where she was or how 
promiscuous she has been in the past, inferring that she was contributory 
negligent.34 Rape shield laws wish to restrict these tactics from severely 
deviating and shifting the focus from reliable evidence in the present trial. 
 
Another purpose is to protect sexual offence victims from the degradation of 
having to disclose intimate and embarrassing details about their private 
lives.35 Anderson, however, argues that this secondary trauma, while real and 
severe, is not the legal purpose of rape shield laws.36 The essential purpose is 
to prevent decisions being based on unfair, prejudicial and often irrelevant 
evidence of a complainant’s sexual history.37 There is a danger in conflating 
the two purposes. The implication of the emphasis on privacy is that women 
who freely engage in sexual conduct, such as prostitutes, are often seen as 
undeserving of the purpose of rape shields, since their sexual conduct is seen 
as taking place in a ‘public’ space. 
 
The legislative objective behind rape shield laws are also aimed at protecting 
sexual offence victims from victimisation under the legal process, to 
encourage the reporting of sexual offences,38 to promote the administration of 
justice, and to serve as an educational tool to change attitudes to sexual 
                                                 
32 Anderson (note 3) at 96. 
33 S v Balhuber 1987 (1) PH H22 (A); S v N 1988 (3) SA 450 (A); S v M 2002 (2) SACR 411 (SCA). 
34 Raeder (note 23) at 12.  
35 John McDonough Consent v Credibility: The Complications of Evidentiary Purpose Rape Shield 
Statutes (2006) Law and Society Journal at UCSB Volume V at 11. 
36 Anderson (note 3) at 104. 
37 Anderson (note 3) at 110. 
38 Raeder (note 23) at 12.  
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assault.39 It is necessary to investigate each of these features separately, in 
order to properly understand the necessity of rape shield provisions in our 
law. Each of these features will be investigated and elaborated upon under 
the section of the paper involving the limitations analysis.40 The limitations 
stage of the inquiry is the most appropriate point in the argument to test the 
purposes of rape shield laws against the competing interests of the accused. 
 
 
3. The History of Section 227 in South Africa 
 
South Africa’s rape shield law is contained in Section 227 of the Criminal 
Procedure Act. Prior to enactment in 1989, there was no rape shield available 
to protect complainants of sexual offences and evidentiary rules were 
governed by the common law. The statutory enactment of the rape shield law 
has faced recent amendment in order to bring it more in line with South 
Africa’s constitutional dispensation. 
 
This part of the paper will lay out the history of the evidentiary rules relating to 
the character and prior sexual history evidence of a sexual offence 
complainant, from the common law, through to the current section 227 which 
was amended in 2007 by the Criminal Law Amendment (Sexual Offences and 
Related Matters) Act. 
 
 
3.1. The Common Law Rule 
 
In criminal cases generally, a complainant who testifies is subject to cross-
examination, and may be asked questions that will reveal credibility, or lack 
thereof. The character of the complainant is not relevant to credibility, and 
therefore evidence solely directed at establishing the bad character of the 
                                                 
39 Hon, Neville Wran, Premier of NSW, HSW Hansard, Legislative Assembly, 18 March 1981 at 4758, 
as quoted in Heroines of Fortitude at 223. 
40 See footnote 202 
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complainant is prohibited.41 However, there is a common law rule that the 
accused may cross-examine the complainant as to her bad character due to 
lack of chastity in a case involving rape or indecent assault, as this line of 
questioning was considered relevant to credibility.42 Prior to its amendment in 
1989, section 227 of the Criminal Procedure Act provided that the 
admissibility of character evidence of a complainant in a sexual offence case, 
would be determined according to the common law rules.43 It was also 
recognised that the general reputation on the complainant could be relevant to 
the issue of whether consent was given.44 
 
The common law relating to the sexual history of the complainant was not 
very clear, as three variables were involved, namely, whether the evidence 
had to be given by a witness of the defence or extracted from the complainant 
during cross-examination; whether the evidence was adduced for purposes of 
the credibility of the complainant or for substantive issues such as consent; 
and, the nature of the evidence, whether it pertained to the general reputation 
of the complainant, the sexual relations between the accused and the 
complainant on other occasions, or sexual relations with persons other than 
the accused.45 
 
The common law provisions were, thus, heavily criticised. The inconsistency 
with which the common law rule was applied blurred the circumstances under 
which prior history could be adduced, as well as the purpose for which such 
evidence was allowed to be adduced. Generally speaking, therefore, although 
the rule allowed evidence of the complainant’s sexual conduct with persons 
other than the accused only where relevance could be established to an issue 
other than general character,46 evidence as to the character of the 
complainant was often adduced for no reason other than to show bad 
reputation for lack of chastity.47 
                                                 
41 PJ Schwikkard and SE Van der Merwe et al. Principles of Evidence 3rd ed. (2009) at 65. 
42 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 65-66. 
43 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 66. 
44 Etienne du Toit et al Commentary on the Criminal Procedure Act 1987 at 24-100A.  
45 Du Toit (note 44) at 24-100A. 
46 R v Adamstein 1937 CPD 331. 
47 DT Zeffertt & AP Paizes The South African Law of Evidence 2nd ed. (2009) at 263. 
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3.2. The 1989 Enactment 
 
It was admitted by the South African Law Commission,48 that the common law 
position was a relic from an era when it was generally accepted that “no 
decent woman had sexual intercourse outside marriage”.49 Thus, on the 
recommendations of the South African Law Commission, section 227 of the 
Criminal Procedure Act was enacted so that evidence relating to the sexual 
conduct of the complainant outside of the conduct complained of became 
inadmissible, as well as making cross-examination of such matters 
impermissible.50 The only way to have evidence of this nature admitted in 
court was to make application to court for leave to adduce evidence, or 
question the complainant, with regard to her previous sexual history. Such 
leave would only be granted if its relevance could be established.51 Relevance 
became the only criterion upon which admissibility could be based.52 
 
The purpose behind the amendment of the previous position was to ensure 
that only evidence which was relevant would be admissible. This seems to be 
in keeping with the general rules of the law of evidence. However, this 
provision was in practice still ineffective because, it was argued, it conferred 
too wide a discretion on judicial officers, who in the past had failed to properly 
exercise their discretion to exclude irrelevant previous sexual history 
evidence.53 Another problem with the relevancy test is that it is an 
insufficiently objective criterion, since myths and stereotypes in the area of 
sexual offences are often employed in determining relevance.54 Furthermore, 
relevance was not defined or restricted, and was therefore open to a court to 
interpret and apply as it saw fit.55 
 
                                                 
48 SA Law Commission: Project 45 (note 28). 
49 SA Law Commission: Project 45 (note 28) at para 3.9. 
50 Du Toit (note 44) at 24-100B. 
51 Section 2 of the Criminal Law and Criminal Procedure Amendment Act 39 of 1989. 
52 Du Toit (note 44) at 24-100B. 
53 Sexual Offences Commentary (note 6) at 23-13. 
54 Jennifer Temkin Sexual History Evidence (1993) Criminal Law Review 3. 
55 Du Toit (note 44) at 24-100B. 
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The Commission had considered two different trends in other jurisdictions, 
one which prohibited evidence and cross-examination on the complainant’s 
sexual history with anyone other than the accused,56 and the other, which left 
it to the discretion of the presiding officer in each case whether to allow 
evidence or cross-examination of the complainant’s sexual history with a 
person other than the accused.57 The Commission’s recommendation was a 
fairly balanced path between the two trends, whereby a limited restriction be 
placed on sexual history with other persons, which would only be permitted 
after an application heard in camera was granted.58 
 
 
3.3. The 2007 Amendment 
 
The most recent amendment of section 227 came into effect through the 
process of discussion and recommendations by the South African Law 
Commission.59 Because the 1989 amendment still left open very wide 
discretion to judicial officers, in 2002 the Law Commission was persuaded by 
pressure from academics as well as the lobbying efforts of woman’s groups,60 
that further amendments were necessary.61 
 
The amendment to section 227 was brought to legislative life in the 2007 
Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related Matters) Amendment Act 
(hereafter referred to as the “2007 Sexual Offences Act).62 Section 227 reads 
as follows: 
 
(1) Evidence as to the character of the accused or as to the character of 
any person against or in connection with whom a sexual offence as 
contemplated in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
                                                 
56 The rape shield provision in the State of Michigan is an example of this strict approach.  
57 Zeffertt and Paizes (note 47) at 264. 
58 South African Law Commission: Project 45 (note 28) at para 3.28. 
59 South African Law Commission, Discussion Paper 102, Project 107, Sexual Offences: Process and 
Procedure December 2001, Chapter 32. 
60 Inter alia, Rape Crisis and The Women’s Legal Centre. 
61 Schwikkard in Artz and Smythe (note 6) at 95. 
62 Act 32 of 2007. 
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Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, is alleged to have been committed, 
shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), be admissible or 
inadmissible if such evidence would have been admissible or 
inadmissible on the 30th day of May, 1961. 
(2) No evidence as to any previous sexual experience or conduct of any 
person against or in connection with whom a sexual offence is 
alleged to have been committed, other than evidence relating to 
sexual experience or conduct in respect of the offence which is being 
tried, shall be adduced, and no evidence or question in cross-
examination regarding such sexual experience or conduct, shall be 
put to such person, the accused or any other witness at the 
proceedings pending before the court unless – 
(a) the court has, on application by a party to the proceedings, granted 
leave to adduce such evidence or to put such question; or 
(b) such evidence has been introduced by the prosecution. 
(3) Before an application for leave contemplated in subsection (2)(a) is 
heard, the court may direct that any person, including the 
complainant, whose presence is not necessary may not be present at 
the proceedings. 
(4) The court shall subject to subsection (6), grant the application 
referred to in subsection (2)(a) only if satisfied that such evidence or 
questioning is relevant to the proceedings pending before the court. 
(5) In determining whether evidence or questioning as contemplated in 
this section is relevant to the proceedings before the court, the court 
shall take into account whether such evidence or questioning – 
(a) is in the interests of justice, with due regard to the accused’s right 
to a fair trial; 
(b) is in the interests of society in encouraging the reporting of sexual 
offences; 
(c) relates to a specific instance of sexual activity relevant to a fact in 
issue; 
(d) is likely to rebut evidence previously adduced by the prosecution; 
(e) is fundamental to the accused’s defence; 
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(f) is not substantially outweighed by its potential prejudice to the 
complainant’s personal dignity and right to privacy; or 
(g) is likely to explain the presence of semen or the source of 
pregnancy or disease or any injury to the complainant, where it is 
relevant to a fact in issue. 
(6) The court shall not grant an application referred to in subsection 
(2)(a) if, in its opinion, such evidence or questioning is sought to be 
adduced to support an inference that by reason of the sexual nature 
of the complainant’s experience or conduct, the complainant – 
(a) is more likely to have consented to the offence being tried; or 
(b) is less worthy of belief. 
(7) The court shall provide reasons for granting or refusing an application 
in terms of subsection 2(a), which reasons shall be entered into the 
record of the proceedings. 
 
Section 227 as it stands in the new Sexual Offences Act will be properly 
interpreted further in the paper. However, a few aspects of the new section 
227 will be outlined here, merely to show the similarities and differences with 
the old section 227. 
 
There are some similarities with the old position. Firstly, the evidence relating 
to sexual conduct in respect of the offence being tried is still admissible. 
Secondly, prior sexual history with anyone other than the accused may not be 
adduced or raised in cross-examination without leave of the court. Thirdly, 
leave will only be granted if the court is satisfied that the evidence or line of 
questioning is relevant. 
 
There are, however, a number of differences. According to section 227(2)(a), 
it is expressly provided that prior sexual history evidence is exempt from the 
general prohibition as well as the requirement that leave from the court is 
necessary, where such evidence has been introduced by the prosecution. 
This does not mean that such evidence is automatically admissible, the 
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evidence still has to meet the general rules of admissibility, but it is freed from 
the general exclusionary rule.63 
 
Secondly, section 227(5) contains a list of factors which the court has to take 
into account when deciding whether to grant leave for the complainant’s prior 
sexual history to be adduced or cross-examined.64 The aim of these factors is 
to set out the circumstances in which prior sexual history evidence may be 
admitted. 
 
Further, according to section 227(7), the court has to give reasons for granting 
or refusing an application for leave to adduce or question issues of sexual 
history. This will force a court to properly engage with section 227 as well as 
with the evidence, and promote better general accountability. 
 
Subsection (6) instructs a court to refuse leave if the purpose for which it is 
being adduced is to support an inference that the complainant is likely to have 
consented or is not truthful. Thus, the privacy and dignity of the complainant 
must be protected, unless a court finds that such evidence is relevant and 
necessary according to the list of factors. The court has no discretion in the 
matter, since once it has determined that one of the prohibited inferences is in 
issue it has to dismiss the application. In effect this creates an exclusionary 
rule.65 Evidence becomes inadmissible, not by the fact of how the court itself 
would make use of the evidence if it had the opportunity to engage with it, but 
because of the purpose for which it is sought to be adduced. 
 
The amendments to section 227 are extremely important and essential to 
ending the tradition of avoiding proper engagement with the rape shield law 
and to curtail the too easy admission of the prior sexual history evidence of 
sexual offence complainants. 
 
                                                 
63 Du Toit (note 44) at 24-100D. 
64 These factors will be analysed more fully further on as part of the section on the limitation of the 
accused’s rights to a fair trial. 
65 Du Toit (note 44) at 24-100E. This issue will be investigated in detail further on, where it will be 
determined if it withstands constitutional scrutiny. 
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The paper will now move to outline the constitutional challenge to section 227. 
 
 
4. The Constitutional Challenge to Section 227 
 
Section 35(3) of the Constitution entrenches the right of every accused person 
to a fair trial. For the purposes of this paper, the most relevant component is 
35(3)(i), which embeds the right to adduce and challenge evidence. Section 
35(3)(i) reads as follows: 
 
(3) Every accused person has the right to a fair trial, which includes 
the right – 
(i) to adduce and challenge evidence. 
 
 
4.1. General constitutional challenge 
 
The constitutional challenge to section 227 in general is that by restricting the 
kind of evidence that is allowed to be admitted into evidence or restricting the 
line of questioning that is allowed, the accused’s rights to adduce and 
challenge evidence is infringed. 
On first appearance it appears that section 227 does to some extent limit the 
right to adduce and challenge evidence. Whether there is in fact a limitation of 
the right or not, can only be determined by first interpreting section 35(3)(i) of 
the Constitution with regard to its scope. It is also necessary to consider how 
much infringement is required before it can be said that the right to adduce 
and challenge evidence is sufficiently adversely affected to require a 
limitations analysis under section 36 of the Constitution.66 Only then is it 
possible to say whether section 227 infringes an accused’s right to adduce 
and challenge evidence. 
 
                                                 
66 Woolman et al Constitutional Law of South Africa Volume 3 (2009) at 51-165. 
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Under normal circumstances, a limitations analysis will only be conducted if it 
is found that a right is restricted. However, for the purposes of the paper, it is 
necessary to undertake a limitations analysis even if the view taken here is 
that the scope of section 35(3)(i) does not include the right to adduce 
evidence of, or question a complainant regarding, prior sexual history 
evidence. This is to ensure that the constitutional challenge is properly dealt 
with, leaving no gaps in the discussion, as well as to answer any possible 
critiques that may be levelled at the argument posited herein. 
 
The next question is whether this limitation is justifiable in terms of section 36 
of the Constitution. The paper will, therefore, consider the legitimacy of this 
constitutional challenge to section 227 by delving into a limitations analysis, 
which will specifically include the scope of the fair trial rights of the accused, 
as well as taking due regard of the competing interests of the victim to have 
her dignity and privacy respected. 
 
 
4.2. Constitutional challenge: specific provisions of section 227 
 
The general challenge is not the only constitutional challenge that can be 
levelled against section 227. Certain individual aspects of section 227 have 
been criticised for their potential in not being able to face constitutional muster 
if ever they are challenged in court. The particular provisions that will be 
individually discussed are, subsection (1), (2), (5) and (6). It will then have to 
be determined, whether on a literal reading of the sections they limit the rights 
of the accused in terms of section 35(3)(i), and whether these limitations are 
unjustifiable. 
 
The paper will also investigate the argument that it is possible to read these 
provisions in a way that does not unjustifiably limit the rights of the accused. If 
this is possible then it may not be necessary to challenge their validity, only to 
ensure that they are interpreted to justifiably limit section 35(3)(i). In order to 
ensure that the argument is complete and legally sound, a limitations analysis 
will be conducted to test its justifiability. 
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In order to begin the investigation of the validity of the constitutional 
challenges levelled against section 227, the scope of the constitutional right to 
adduce and challenge evidence as enshrined in section 35(3)(i) will have to 
be determined. 
 
 
5. The Scope of Section 35(3)(i): The Right to Adduce and 
Challenge Evidence 
 
Section 39(1) of the Constitution contains an interpretation clause, and 
includes instruction as to what a court ought to consider when interpreting the 
Bill of Rights. The section makes it mandatory, by means of the word "must", 
for any court to "promote the values that underline an open and democratic 
society based on human dignity, equality and freedom".67 The section equally 
makes it mandatory, again by means of the use of the word "must" as a prefix, 
for a court to consider international law.68  Finally the section encourages, but 
in the use of the word "may" fails to make it mandatory, the use of foreign 
law.69 
 
The underlying point to the interpretation of the Bill of Rights can be 
understood by means of four principles, namely, looking to the actual "text", 
using a "purposive interpretation", which is both "generous" towards the right 
itself and cognisant of the "context".70 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
67 Section 39(1)(a).  
68 Section 39(1)(b). 
69 Section 39(1)(c). 
70 Iain Currie and Johan de Waal The Bill of Rights Handbook 5th ed (2008) at 145. 
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5.1. The Literal Meaning of the Text 
 
The starting point for interpreting a provision of the Bill of Rights is the 
language of the text itself. In the first Constitutional Court judgment in S v 
Zuma,71 the Court said: 
 
“While we must always be conscious of the values underlying the 
Constitution, it is nonetheless our task to interpret a written instrument. 
The Constitution does not mean whatever we might wish it to mean… 
the language… must be respected.”72 
 
In the case of section 35(3)(i) the language used is very concise and 
unspecific. Included in the broad right of an accused’s right to a "fair trial" is 
the right to "adduce" and "challenge” evidence.73 The golden rule of 
interpretation is to look to the “plain words” used and to give them their 
ordinary meaning.74 Applying the golden rule to “the right to adduce and 
challenge evidence”, it seems clear that the right includes both the capacity to 
introduce new evidence before the court, and secondly, to test evidence that 
has already been presented. It seems then that the literal meaning of the text 
does not provide a clear indication of its denotation, or to put it more clearly, it 
does not provide an indication of the extent of the right. 
 
The literal meaning of the text in isolation is seldom sufficient to understand 
the true scope of a constitutional provision. Even where the literal meaning 
appears self-evident, other interpretive tools ought also to be employed to 
give a proper interpretation to a provision.75 The Court in S v Makwanyane 
summarised the approach to the proper interpretation of the Bill of Rights: 
 
                                                 
71 1995 (2) SA 642 (CC) at para 17. 
72 Ibid. 
73 Section 35(3)(i).  
74 Lourens Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 1st ed (2007) at 103. 
75 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 148. 
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“Whilst paying due regard to the language that has been used, [an 
interpretation of the Bill of Rights should be] ‘generous’ and ‘purposive’ 
and ‘give…expression to the underlying values of the Constitution”.76 
 
Aligning the two seemingly contradictory approaches by the Constitutional 
Court in Zuma and in Makwanyane, Currie and de Waal suggest that a 
reconciled approach is to accept the literal meaning of the text if it accords 
with a generous and purposive interpretation that takes due account of the 
underlying values of the Constitution.77 
 
 
5.2. A Purposive Interpretation 
 
It is clear that the purpose of section 35(3)(i) is to constitutionally entrench the 
accused’s rights to a fair trial. What is not clear is whether the purpose is to 
extend the rights beyond their meaning at common law. The “right to adduce 
and challenge evidence” is ambiguous and does not give any indication of the 
scope or limitation of the right. Thus, at first sight, it appears that the right 
extends to all evidence. It is therefore necessary to apply a purposive 
approach to determine the scope of the right. 
 
Purposive interpretation is aimed at understanding the core values that 
underpin the listed fundamental rights in an open and democratic society, 
based on human dignity equality and freedom, and then to prefer an 
interpretation of the provision in question which best complies with those 
values.78 Once the purpose of the right has been identified, it is possible to 
then determine the scope of the right.79 Purposive interpretation recognises 
that the interpretation of the Bill of Rights involves a value judgment, but does 
not prescribe how the value judgment is to be made, as well as emphasising 
                                                 
76 S v Makwanyane 1995 (3) SA 391 (CC) at para 9. 
77 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 148. 
78 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 148. 
79 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 149. 
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that this value judgment should not be construed as the importation of public 
opinion.80 
 
There are two ways in which evidence may be adduced. Firstly, by oral 
evidence, and secondly, by physical evidence,81 both of which can be 
provided by the accused or a witness. The right to introduce new evidence 
and the right to challenge evidence shall be examined separately as the 
objects of these two elements are clearly distinguishable.82 
 
The law of evidence is governed by the common law and by statute, both of 
which include evidentiary rules that limit the kind of evidence that an accused 
may adduce or challenge.83 Generally, only evidence that is relevant is 
admissible.84 There is no reason to believe that by including the right to 
adduce evidence in the Constitution, the drafters intended to endow the 
accused with the right to adduce irrelevant evidence. Therefore, arguably, on 
a purposive interpretation, the general common law rule with regard to 
relevance remains. The only difference is that the right has constitutional 
protection. The scope of the right to adduce evidence thus extends only as far 
as relevant evidence. 
 
Ordinarily, evidence regarding a complainant’s prior sexual history does not 
assist the court in reaching a decision on the actual issues in dispute, and is 
therefore irrelevant and inadmissible. The right in section 35(3)(i) cannot be 
read as extending the accused’s right to adduce evidence to allowing 
irrelevant prior sexual history evidence. 
 
Such an interpretation is in accordance with the underlying values of the 
Constitution, in particular human dignity. The Constitution clearly protects the 
                                                 
80 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 150. 
81 This includes documentary evidence, real evidence and electronic evidence. 
82 The reason for this division shall be become clear when discussing a proper interpretation of section 
227 of the CPA, which refers to both adducing evidence and cross-examination, without separating the 
two. 
83 Hearsay evidence is a good example of this, and is governed by section 3 of the Law of Evidence 
Amendment Act of 1988. 
84 Section 210 of the Criminal Procedure Act 51 of 1977. 
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right of the accused to a fair trial, but if this extended to allowing irrelevant 
evidence, of which the prejudice to the complainant clearly outweighed its 
probative value, the dignity of the complainant would be trampled on. 
 
The right to challenge evidence can likewise also be done by adducing new 
contradictory evidence. This is not a problem at this stage, because the 
accused is allowed, according to section 227(5)(d), to admit sexual history 
evidence where it is to dispute evidence already admitted by the prosecution, 
or as in section 227(5)(e), it is fundamental to the accused’s defence. 
 
However, the question in dispute is how the right to challenge evidence aligns 
itself with the right to cross-examine. Cross-examination is an essential part of 
an adversarial system, and is the stage at which the defence should be 
introduced.85 The court has no right to prevent cross-examination, even where 
the purpose is to protect the witness.86 It is clear that the right to adduce and 
challenge evidence includes the right to confront one’s accuser and to cross-
examine them.87 
 
The purpose of cross-examination is to elicit favourable facts to the cross-
examiner’s case and to challenge the accuracy of the witness’s version.88 The 
scope of cross-examination is wider than examination-in-chief, and cross-
examination is not restricted to matters covered by the witness in her 
evidence-in-chief.89 However, there are limits to what may be cross-
examined.90 The court retains the discretion to disallow questioning which is 
“irrelevant, unduly repetitive, oppressive or otherwise improper”.91 
Inadmissible evidence may not be put to or elicited from a witness, and where 
such evidence is elicited, this evidence does not become admissible.92 
 
                                                 
85 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 366. 
86 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 366. 
87 Davis, Cheadle and Haysom Constitutional Law: Bill of Rights of South Africa (2005) at 29-27. 
88 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 366. 
89 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 366. 
90 Davis, Cheadle and Haysom (note 87)  at 29-27. 
91 Kink v Regional Court Magistrate NO and Others 1996 (3) BCLR 402 (SE) at 410A-B. 
92 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 367. 
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As with adducing evidence, there seems to be no reason to believe that the 
constitutional entrenchment of the right to challenge evidence has become 
sufficiently wide to allow the eliciting of inadmissible evidence during cross-
examination. Thus, the scope of the right to adduce and challenge evidence 
does not extend to adducing and eliciting inadmissible evidence. 
 
Furthermore, the right to cross-examine falls under the broader right to 
challenge evidence. The right to challenge evidence involves the refuting of 
evidence tendered by the other side. In the case of S v Mosoetsa,93 it was 
emphasised that an accused had to be informed of his right to dispute any 
evidence submitted by the state, and that he could present any evidence to 
the contrary. 
 
In the case of S v Ndhlovu,94 Cameron JA held: 
 
“I cannot accept, however, that 'use of hearsay evidence by the State 
violates the accused's right to challenge evidence by cross-
examination', if it is meant that the inability to cross-examine the source 
of a statement in itself violates the right to 'challenge' evidence. The Bill 
of Rights does not guarantee an entitlement to subject all evidence to 
cross-examination. What it contains is the right (subject to limitation in 
terms of s 36) to 'challenge evidence'.”95 (emphasis added) 
 
It is submitted that when the defence questions a complainant about her prior 
sexual history, without prior or subsequent evidence being tendered in that 
regard, there is no evidence that is being challenged. In fact, new evidence is 
being elicited, without allowing the opportunity for the other side to challenge 
this evidence. This is a circumventing of the general rules related to the 
admission of evidence. 
 
                                                 
93 2005 (1) SACR 304 (T). 
94 2002 (2) SACR 325 (SCA). 
95 Supra note 94 at para 24. 
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Thus, cross-examination that seeks to elicit new evidence regarding the 
complainant’s prior sexual history does not fall under the protection of 
‘challenging evidence’ as contained in section 35(3)(i). 
 
 
5.3. Generous Interpretation 
 
Generous interpretation is interpretation in favour of rights and against their 
restriction, by drawing the boundaries as widely as the language allows.96 
However, a court when faced with conflicting interpretations between 
purposive and generous interpretation, will choose to understand the scope of 
the right in terms of its purpose.97 
 
Thus, we have to understand the right to adduce and challenge evidence 
generously, especially with regard to the fact that it forms part of the broader 
right to a fair trial. A clear purpose of the provision is to create a negative 
obligation on the part of the court which is barred from preventing evidence 
necessary for a proper defence to be introduced, a purpose which must be 
interpreted generously. 
 
However, as already shown, it is not the purpose of the constitutional 
entrenchment, to allow evidence that is inadmissible. A generous approach 
cannot be used to go further than the literal and purposive approach allows. 
Therefore, if we favour a purposive approach, the scope of the right is only to 
constitutionally protect the right of an accused to adduce and challenge 
evidence that is relevant and necessary, and hence admissible, for his 
defence. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
96 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 150. 
97 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 152-153. 
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5.4. Contextual Interpretation 
 
The meaning of a constitutional provision must be read in context in order to 
ascertain the purpose. ‘Context’ in a wider construction involves the historical 
and political background of the Constitution, and the narrower construction 
involves the context set out by the constitutional text.98 
 
The contextual interpretation does not provide an interpretation that would 
either extend or limit the understanding of section 35(3)(i). It is therefore not 
necessary to focus on a contextual interpretation. 
 
 
5.5. Foreign Law 
 
According to section 39(1)(c) of the Constitution, a court when interpreting a 
provision in the Bill of Rights, may have regard to foreign law. Although any 
findings under different jurisdictions would only be persuasive in a South 
African court, it would be interesting and helpful to consider the 
constitutionality of rape shield laws in other countries, particularly since similar 
constitutional arguments have been levelled against rape shield provisions in 
almost all jurisdictions. 
 
The paper will discuss the jurisprudence of three other jurisdictions, namely, 
Canada, the United States of America and England. These jurisdictions were 
chosen for varying and important reasons. Section 227 was modelled along 
the Canadian approach, making jurisprudence from Canada on this issue an 
important point of reference. The first rape shield law was enacted in 
Michigan, which gives the United States a unique milestone position in the 
history of rape shield laws. The laws of evidence in South Africa originate to a 
large extent from the evidentiary rules of England. Prior to the enactment of a 
rape shield provision in 1989, the common law of South Africa was based on 
the laws of England. 
                                                 
98 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 153. 
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Canada 
 
Under the common law, the complainant could be questioned about her prior 
sexual history, without having to prove that it was relevant to a particular 
issue.99 The complainant could be questioned about her sexual conduct with 
the accused as well as with others, but she could not be compelled to answer 
questions regarding her conduct with persons other than the accused.100 
 
Legislative attempts to amend the common law position took effect in the 
Criminal Code of Canada. Section 277 renders evidence of sexual reputation 
completely inadmissible, the rationale being that a woman’s sexual reputation 
is not relevant to her credibility as a witness.101 Section 276 prohibits sexual 
history evidence of the complainant with persons other than the accused. 
Thus, if the accused adduces evidence of a relationship between himself and 
the complainant, the evidence is admissible unless it relates to the sexual 
reputation of the complainant.102 
 
In the case of R v Seaboyer; R v Gayme,103 the rape shield law was 
challenged for its constitutionality. The appellants were charged with sexual 
assault on two separate incidents, and both wanted to introduce evidence of 
the complainant’s sexual history with other men. They challenged section 276 
on the ground that the evidence was vital to a proper defence and that the 
exclusion of the evidence would deny them a fair trial.104 They further 
contended that section 276 and section 277 were unconstitutional because 
they violated section 7105 and section 11(d)106 of the Canadian Charter of 
Rights and Freedoms.107 
                                                 
99 Illsley (note 8) at 227. 
100 Illsley (note 8) at 227-228. 
101 Section 277: “In proceedings in respect of an offence under section 151, 152, 153, 155 or159, 
subsection 160(2) or (3) or section 170, 171, 172, 173, 271, 272 or 273,evidence of sexual reputation, 
whether general or specific, is not admissible for the purpose of challenging or supporting the 
credibility of the complainant.” 
102 Illsley (note 8) at 229. 
103 (1991) 83 DLR (4th) 193. 
104 Illsley (note 8) at 229. 
105 “Everyone has the right to life, liberty and security of the person and the right not to be deprived 
thereof except in accordance with the principles of fundamental justice.” 
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The Supreme Court discounted the contention levelled against section 277, 
holding that evidence of sexual reputation is irrelevant and rightly 
inadmissible. The Court held that there is no link between a woman’s sexual 
reputation and whether she is telling the truth.108 
 
With regard to section 276, the majority held that it did infringe the rights of 
the accused under the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and that it 
was not justifiable under the limitations clause.109 The rationale for this 
decision was that section 276 contained a ‘blanket exclusion’ which did not 
correlate to the purpose of the provisions. Rape shield laws are not aimed at 
evidence of sexual activity, but to prevent the misuse of such evidence for 
irrelevant and presumptuous means.110 
 
On the other hand, the minority held that section 276 did not infringe the fair 
trial rights of the accused, and even if it did, it could be justified in terms of the 
limitations clause in section 1 of the Charter. 
 
The Court in Seaboyer provided a number of guidelines that were aimed at 
assisting judges in determining when sexual history evidence is admissible. 
The Court suggested a voir dire,111 in order to determine whether the 
probative value of the evidence outweighs the potential prejudice.112 
 
The government responded to Seaboyer by rewording the rape shield 
legislation.113 The rape shield legislation as it stands at present creates a 
                                                                                                                                            
106 “Any person charged with an offence has the right…(d) to be presumed innocent until proven guilty 
according to law in a fair and public hearing by an independent and impartial tribunal." 
107 Part I of the Constitution Act, 1982. 
108 (1991) 83 DLR (4th) 193 at para 55. 
109 Section 1 of the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms. 
110 Illsley (note 8) at 230. 
111 This is already a mechanism under South African law as the means of determining the admissibility 
of prior sexual history evidence is conducted in camera during the trial-within-a-trial. 
112 Illsley (note 8) at 231. 
113 Section 276(2) now reads as follows: 
1. Application in writing specifying in a detailed way the particulars of the evidence and why the 
defence claims it is relevant to an issue at trial.  
2. If notice requirements are met and the trial judge believes that the potential evidence is capable of 
being admissible under s. 276(2), then, a voir dire is held in to determine the admissibility of a 
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procedure intended to eliminate surprise and unnecessary exposure of the 
complainant to inappropriate questioning. 
 
In the case of R. v. Darrach,114 the Supreme Court of Canada confirmed that 
the amended section 276 is constitutional. According to the court, exclusion of 
a complainant’s history is only automatic where it is used to support an 
inference that the complainant is more likely to have consented to the sexual 
assault or that she is less credible as a witness by virtue of her previous 
sexual experiences. The court found that the new legislation did not interfere 
with the accused’s opportunity to present a full defence. As such, it does not 
violate the Canadian Charter of Rights and Freedoms, and was constitutional. 
 
 
United States of America 
 
The State of Michigan 
 
Michigan’s rape shield provision prohibits an accused from introducing 
evidence of a rape complainant’s past sexual conduct.115 The approach in the 
Michigan statute is a complete exclusion, subject to two exceptions. Firstly, it 
                                                                                                                                            
particular line of questioning. The complainant cannot be compelled to testify at the voire dire. 
However, the defence, must at minimum establish that such an inquiry should be allowed due to 
specific concerns. This is problematic because it may alert the Crown to the details of the defence’s 
argument in an attempt to get evidence into the trial.  
3. If the application succeeds the trial judge must give mandatory reasons and specific reference must 
be made to the factors in s. 276(3). 
114 [2000] 2 S.C.R. 443, 2000 SCC 46. 
115 The Michigan provision reads as follows:  
“(1) Evidence of specific instances of the victim’s sexual conduct, opinion evidence of the victim’s 
sexual conduct, and reputation evidence of the victim’s sexual conduct shall not be admitted under 
sections 520b to 520g unless and only to the extent that the judge finds that the following proposed 
evidence is material to a fact at issue in the case and that its inflammatory or prejudicial nature does not 
outweigh its probative value: 
(a) Evidence of the victim’s past sexual conduct with the actor. 
(b) Evidence of specific instances of sexual activity showing the source or origin of semen, 
pregnancy, or disease. 
(2) If the defendant proposes to offer evidence described in subsection 1(a) or (b), the defendant within 
10 days after the arraignment on the information shall file a written motion and offer of proof. The 
court may order an in camera hearing to determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under 
subsection (1). If new information is discovered during the course of the trial that may make the 
evidence described in subsection (1)(a) or (b) admissible, the judge may order an in camera hearing to 
determine whether the proposed evidence is admissible under subsection (1).” 
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permits the accused to introduce evidence of his own past sexual conduct 
with the complainant, and secondly, it allows evidence which establishes the 
origin of semen, pregnancy or disease. The constitutionality of the rape shield 
provision has been challenged on a number of occasions, three of which are 
herein discussed. 
 
In the case of People v Arenda,116 the accused in the circuit court was 
charged with, and convicted of, three counts of sexual assault with an eight-
year-old boy. The Court of Appeal reversed the decision. The matter was 
appealed again to the Supreme Court. 
 
The defendant sought to admit prior sexual conduct of the complainant in 
order to establish that the sexual knowledge of the complainant did not 
originate from sexual experience with the defendant. The argument posited on 
behalf of the accused was that evidence of sexual knowledge in this context 
was similar to establishing the presence of semen or pregnancy, because it 
was to show the origin of the victim’s knowledge. The accused contended that 
the statutory provisions contained in the rape shield provision infringed upon 
his sixth amendment right to confrontation. 
 
The Sixth Amendment reads as follows: 
 
“In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right to a 
speedy and public trial, by an impartial jury of the State and district 
wherein the crime shall have been committed, which district shall have 
been previously ascertained by law, and to be informed of the nature 
and cause of the accusation; to be confronted with the witnesses 
against him; to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his 
favour; and to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” 
(emphasis added) 
 
                                                 
116 416 Mich. 1, 330 N.W.2d 814 (1982). 
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The Court considered the right to confront in the Sixth Amendment, and 
concluded that the right to confront is not without limits, and does not include 
a right to cross-examine on irrelevant issues. 
 
The court held that the rape shield law served the interests of the state by 
protecting the complainant from undue harassment and respecting her 
privacy, as well as by encouraging the reporting of sexual assaults. It was 
further acknowledged that the rape shield provision aids the truth-seeking 
function of the court by restricting collateral issues from clouding the trial. 
 
The Court mentioned that due to the fact that prior sexual history evidence is 
of minimal relevance in most instances, the prohibitions do not deny or 
significantly diminish an accused’s right of confrontation. The claim that the 
accused’s Sixth Amendment rights were infringed by Michigan’s rape shield 
provision was rejected. 
 
The Court also considered the strength of the argument posited with regard to 
the sexual knowledge of the complainant. It was held that the relevancy of 
evidence of the source of the sexual offence complainant’s knowledge of 
specific sexual acts will generally be minimal but the potential for prejudice is 
substantial. Unlike pregnancy, semen, or disease, the knowledge need not be 
acquired solely through sexual contact, and thus does not fall within the 
exception to the general rule excluding evidence of the complainant’s conduct 
with persons other than the accused. 
 
In the subsequent case of People v Hackett,117 the rape shield provision was 
again constitutionally challenged because it was claimed that it unfairly 
restricts the right to confront contained in the Sixth Amendment. 
The court held that the rape shield provision contains the realization that prior 
sexual history evidence, while may seem logically relevant, is not legally 
relevant. The court agreed with the reasoning in Arenda, that there is a limit to 
the right to confront. However, the court in the present case also 
                                                 
117 421 Mich. 338, 365 N.W.2d 120 (1984). 
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acknowledged that while the extent of the right to cross-examine lies with the 
court, the right to confront guarantees to the defendant a reasonable 
opportunity to test the truthfulness of a witness’ testimony. 
 
The court held that there may be instances where prior sexual history would 
be relevant, such as in the case of proving that the victim laid the charge out 
of spite. However, a court in exercising its discretion should keep in mind the 
important legislative aim of rape shield provisions, and should always favour 
the exclusion of the evidence where its exclusion would not unconstitutionally 
restrict the accused’s rights to confront. 
 
The US Supreme Court had to deal with a slightly different challenge in the 
case of Michigan v Lucas.118 In this case the challenge was to the notice-and-
hearing requirement, which obliges an accused who wishes to admit evidence 
of his own past sexual conduct with the complainant, to make application 
within ten days of arraignment so that an in camera proceeding to determine 
the admissibility of the evidence may be held. 
 
The accused in this case failed to make application, and the court of first 
instance refused to allow the evidence to be admitted. The Court of Appeals 
overturned the conviction, and adopted a per se rule that the statutory notice-
and-hearing requirement violates the Sixth Amendment in all cases where it 
precludes the admission of evidence of a past sexual relationship between the 
accused and the complainant. 
 
The question before the Supreme Court was whether the legitimate interests 
served by the notice requirement could justify preclusion of a prior sexual 
relationship between the parties. In reaching an answer to this question, the 
Court interpreted the scope of the Sixth Amendment in such a way that its 
extent does not “confer the right to present testimony free from the legitimate 
demands of the adversarial system”.119 
 
                                                 
118 500 U.S. 145 (1991). 
119 Supra note 118 at 152. 
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The Court held that the notice-and-hearing requirement serves legitimate 
interests in protecting the complainant from harassment and invasions of 
privacy, and preventing unfair surprise to the prosecution. The Court found 
that the notice-and-hearing requirement did not infringe the Sixth Amendment. 
 
The State of North Carolina 
 
In the case of State v. Fortney,120 the Court found the rape shield law, N.C. 
Gen. Stat. § 8-58.6121 (before it was moved into N.C. Gen. Stat. 8C-1 and the 
rules of evidence) to be constitutional. 
 
The trial court had refused to admit evidence that three different blood 
groupings of semen were found on the clothing the victim wore the night of 
the rape. Defendant argued that the statute was unconstitutional because it 
prevented him from automatically questioning the victim about her prior sexual 
experience, thus his right to confront the victim was compromised. 
                                                 
120 301 N.C. 31, 269 S.E.2d 110 (1980). 
121 N.C. Gen. Stat. § 8-58.6 provides as follows:  
(a) As used in this section, the term "sexual behaviour" means sexual activity of the complainant other 
than the sexual act which is at issue in the indictment on trial.  
(b) The sexual behaviour of the complainant is irrelevant to any issue in the prosecution unless such 
behaviour:  
(1) Was between the complainant and the defendant; or  
(2) Is evidence of specific instances of sexual behaviour offered for the purpose of showing 
that the act or acts charged were not committed by the defendant; or  
(3) Is evidence of a pattern of sexual behaviour so distinctive and so closely resembling the 
defendant's version of the alleged encounter with the complainant as to tend to prove that such 
complainant consented to the act or acts charged or behaved in such a manner as to lead the 
defendant reasonably to believe that the complainant consented; or  
(4) Is evidence of sexual behaviour offered as the basis of expert psychological or psychiatric 
opinion that the complainant fantasized or invented the act or acts charged. 
(c) No evidence of sexual behaviour shall be introduced at any time during the trial of a charge of rape 
or any lesser included offence thereof or a sex offence or any lesser included offence thereof, nor shall 
any reference to any such behaviour be made in the presence of the jury, unless and until the court has 
determined that such behaviour is relevant under subsection (b). Before any questions pertaining to 
such evidence are asked of any witness, the proponent of such evidence shall first apply to the court for 
a determination of the relevance of the sexual behaviour to which it relates. The proponent of such 
evidence may make application either prior to trial pursuant to N.C. Gen. Stat. § 15A-952, or during 
the trial at the time when the proponent desired to introduce such evidence. When application is made, 
the court shall conduct an in-camera hearing, which shall be transcribed, to consider the proponent's 
offer of proof and the arguments of counsel, including any counsel for the complainant, to determine 
the extent to which such behaviour is relevant. In the hearing, the proponent of the evidence shall 
establish the basis of admissibility of such evidence. If the court finds that the evidence is relevant, it 
shall enter an order stating that the evidence may be admitted and the nature of the questions which 
will be permitted. 
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The court held that there was no constitutional right to ask the victim irrelevant 
questions. Furthermore policy reasons with regard to the protection of victims 
of sexual offences supported the statute. It was found that the defendant's 
right to cross-examine the victim was not infringed by the rape shield 
provision. Most importantly, the Court found the provision legitimate as it went 
no further than codifying the rule that only relevant evidence is admissible. 
 
The Court did, however, allow the defence to question the complainant as to 
her sexual activity with third parties on the night of the incident in question, 
because it may have indicated the origin of the semen that was found in her 
vagina. The defence, however, chose not to question the complainant in that 
regard. 
 
Courts have not always found that evidence of intercourse on the same day 
as the alleged incident is relevant. In the case of State v. Rhinehart,122 the 
court did not allow such evidence even though the victim had consensual sex 
with her former boyfriend on the night of the incident. 
 
In the case of State v Harris,123 the defendant wished to question the 
complainant about her sexual activity on the day of the incident in question. 
The majority held that the presence of injury could be attributed to the earlier 
sexual conduct and therefore the trial court erred in rendering the evidence 
inadmissible. The minority, on the other hand, differed, holding that the 
injuries were significant, and there was no evidence that any injury occurred 
during the prior conduct where no intercourse occurred, and the trial court 
was correct in excluding the evidence. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
122 68 N.C.App. 615, 316 S.E.2d 118 (1984). 
123 166 N.C. App. 386, 602 S.E.2d 697 (2004). 
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England 
 
The challenge to the rape shield provision was decided by the House of Lords 
in the case of R v A.124 Section 41 of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence 
Act 1999 imposed a requirement of judicial approval to adduce evidence or 
cross-examine on prior sexual history, but set out the circumstances under 
which judicial leave ought to be given.125 The section prohibited any evidence 
regarding any sexual behaviour of the complainant. 
                                                 
124 [2001] 2 W.L.R. 1546 [HOL]. 
125 Section 41 reads as follows: 
(1)If at a trial a person is charged with a sexual offence, then, except with the leave of the court— 
(a)no evidence may be adduced, and 
(b)no question may be asked in cross-examination, 
by or on behalf of any accused at the trial, about any sexual behaviour of the complainant. 
(2)The court may give leave in relation to any evidence or question only on an application made by or 
on behalf of an accused, and may not give such leave unless it is satisfied— 
(a)that subsection (3) or (5) applies, and 
(b)that a refusal of leave might have the result of rendering unsafe a conclusion of the jury or (as the 
case may be) the court on any relevant issue in the case. 
(3)This subsection applies if the evidence or question relates to a relevant issue in the case and either— 
(a)that issue is not an issue of consent; or 
(b)it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the evidence or 
question relates is alleged to have taken place at or about the same time as the event which is the 
subject matter of the charge against the accused; or 
(c)it is an issue of consent and the sexual behaviour of the complainant to which the evidence or 
question relates is alleged to have been, in any respect, so similar— 
(i)to any sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to evidence adduced or to be adduced 
by or on behalf of the accused) took place as part of the event which is the subject matter of the charge 
against the accused, or 
(ii)to any other sexual behaviour of the complainant which (according to such evidence) took place at 
or about the same time as that event, 
that the similarity cannot reasonably be explained as a coincidence. 
(4)For the purposes of subsection (3) no evidence or question shall be regarded as relating to a relevant 
issue in the case if it appears to the court to be reasonable to assume that the purpose (or main purpose) 
for which it would be adduced or asked is to establish or elicit material for impugning the credibility of 
the complainant as a witness. 
(5)This subsection applies if the evidence or question— 
(a)relates to any evidence adduced by the prosecution about any sexual behaviour of the complainant; 
and 
(b)in the opinion of the court, would go no further than is necessary to enable the evidence adduced by 
the prosecution to be rebutted or explained by or on behalf of the accused. 
(6)For the purposes of subsections (3) and (5) the evidence or question must relate to a specific 
instance (or specific instances) of alleged sexual behaviour on the part of the complainant (and 
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The section was challenged because the prohibition in section 41 extended to 
evidence related to the complainant’s past sexual behaviour with the accused 
himself. Thus, the accused was prevented from adducing evidence that they 
had been in a relationship involving regular consensual intercourse, unless 
the last occasion was “at or about the same time” as the alleged rape.126 
 
The accused and the complainant were involved in a consensual sexual 
relationship over a period of about three weeks prior to the alleged offence. 
The last instance of consensual intercourse took place approximately a week 
before the incident in contention. Under section 41, the accused was 
prevented from questioning the complainant, or adducing evidence, that she 
had consensual sexual intercourse with him during the three weeks prior to 
the alleged incident.127 
 
In the trial Court, the Judge had ruled that the evidence relating to the alleged 
relationship between the accused and the complainant could not be lead. The 
Court of Appeal held that such evidence could be adduced, but only to show 
that he believed that she had consented, not to show that she actually did 
consent.128 
 
The case went on to the House of Lords, where the accused argued that 
prohibiting this evidence was an infringement of his right to a fair trial in terms 
of Article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights. 
                                                                                                                                            
accordingly nothing in those subsections is capable of applying in relation to the evidence or question 
to the extent that it does not so relate). 
(7)Where this section applies in relation to a trial by virtue of the fact that one or more of a number of 
persons charged in the proceedings is or are charged with a sexual offence— 
(a)it shall cease to apply in relation to the trial if the prosecutor decides not to proceed with the case 
against that person or those persons in respect of that charge; but 
(b)it shall not cease to do so in the event of that person or those persons pleading guilty to, or being 
convicted of, that charge. 
(8)Nothing in this section authorises any evidence to be adduced or any question to be asked which 
cannot be adduced or asked apart from this section. 
126 Section 41(3)(b) of the Youth Justice and Criminal Evidence Act 1999. 
127 Illsley (note 8) at 235. 
128 JR Spencer ‘”Rape Shields” and the Right to a Fair Trial’ in Case and Comment (2001) The 
Cambridge Law Journal 60(3) at 453. 
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Four of the five judges in the House of Lords agreed that to ban evidence of 
this nature would be an infringement of the right to a fair trial, because in 
some cases such evidence would be relevant to the issue of consent and 
therefore admissible. However, they held that section 3 of the Human Rights 
Act allowed the courts to interpret the language so that if the evidence was 
relevant it would be admissible.129 On that basis, they held that evidence of 
the complainant’s previous sexual relationship with the defendant could fit 
under section 41(3)(c): “behaviour so similar that the similarity cannot 
reasonably be explained as coincidence”. 
 
The view of the Court was that judges on a case-by-case basis have to 
determine whether the previous sexual history between the accused and the 
complainant is relevant. This determination ought to include awareness of the 
importance of protecting the complainant from humiliation.130 However, if the 
evidence of the previous sexual history between the parties is relevant to the 
issue of consent to such an extent that the fairness of the trial would be 
endangered by its exclusion, the evidence ought to be admitted. The Court 
did not, therefore, find it necessary to declare section 41 incompatible with an 
accused’s fair trial rights.131 
 
The cases discussed above are helpful in presenting some of the challenges 
levelled against rape shield provisions, as well as demonstrating how courts in 
other jurisdictions have dealt with these challenges. The discussions and 
findings of the various courts assist with the interpretation and understanding 
of rape shield laws. These findings are important in a South African setting, in 
order to assist with the interpretation of section 227. 
 
The findings of the foreign courts are also important in interpreting the fair trial 
and due process rights of an accused person, and the degree to which the 
right to adduce evidence and to cross-examine witnesses extends. One of the 
potential arguments posited against the legitimacy of a rape shield provision is 
                                                 
129 Spencer (note 128) at 454.  
130 Illsley (note 8) at 237. 
131 Spencer (note 128) at 454. 
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that due to the constitutional enshrinement of the right to adduce and 
challenge evidence, infringement of the right cannot be justified. However, 
these foreign cases have all formulated similar answers to this challenge, that 
there is no constitutional right to raise evidence that is irrelevant.132 These 
cases are, therefore, important to the interpretation of the right to adduce and 
challenge evidence as contained in South Africa’s Constitution.133 
 
In order to determine whether section 227 limits the right as contained in 
section 35(3)(i), a proper interpretation of the meaning of section 227 has to 
be conducted. 
 
 
6. The Interpretation of Section 227 
 
The golden rule for the interpretation of legislation is to look at the "plain 
words" used in the statute and to accord them their ordinary meaning. 134  
Therefore, when interpreting section 227, the first port of call is the plain 
meaning of the text. 
 
The exceptions to the general rule that the simple language of the text be 
given its ordinary meaning are, firstly, that such a simple reading would create 
an absurdity in the text, and secondly, in the event of ambiguity, any meaning 
contrary to the intention of the drafters.135 
 
Olivier JA in the case of Ncobo and Others v Salimba CC, Ncobo v Van 
Rensburg,136 held that in addition to the conventional caveat of the golden 
rule, where deviation from the "plain words" and their ordinary meaning was 
permissible in the event of absurdity, there is a new exception that has been 
imported by the Bill of Rights. An interpreter may thus deviate from the 
                                                 
132 People v. McKenna, 196 Colo. 367, 585 P. 2d 275 (1978). 
133 Section 35(3)(i). 
134 Lourens Du Plessis Re-Interpretation of Statutes 1st ed (2007) at 103. 
135 Particularly in the case of ambiguity, the intention of the drafters is paramount to a proper 
interpretation of the text in the provision concerned. 
136 1999 (2) SA 1057. 
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ordinary meaning of the text in the event that the meaning accorded to the 
"plain words" is, "unconstitutional or contrary to the spirit, purport and objects 
of the Bill of Rights".137 
 
This exception was introduced by section 39(2) of the Constitution which 
created a new guiding principle for the interpretation of all statutory provisions: 
 
"When interpreting any legislation, and when developing the common 
law or customary law, every court, tribunal or forum must promote the 
spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of Rights." 
 
Langa DP in Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and 
Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd and Others: In re Hyundai Motor 
Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO,138 held that, 
 
"[t]he purport and objects of the Constitution find expression in section 
1 which lays out the fundamental values which the Constitution is 
designed to achieve. The Constitution requires that judicial officers 
read legislation, where possible, in ways which give effect to its 
fundamental values. Consistently with this, when the constitutionality of 
legislation is in issue, they are under a duty to examine the objects and 
purport of an Act and to read the provisions of the legislation, so far as 
possible, in conformity with the Constitution." 
 
A natural corollary of this principle is that constitutionally aligned 
interpretations should be preferred over interpretations conflicting with the 
language of the Constitution or "spirit, purport and objects of the Bill of 
Rights". Therefore, judicial officers have to prefer an interpretation of the 
legislation that complies with constitutional boundaries over an interpretation 
                                                 
137 1999 (2) SA 1057 at para 11. 
138 2001 SA 545 (CC); 2000 (2) SACR 348 CC; 2000 (10) BCLR 1079. 
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that does not, provided that the legislation can reasonably be interpreted in 
such a way.139 
 
It has further been held that section 39(2) "means that all statutes must be 
interpreted through the prism of the Bill of Rights".140 The Constitutional Court 
has confirmed and applied this principle in S v Dzukuda and Others; S v 
Tshilo141 and Chagi and Others v Special Investigating Unit.142 The principle 
has been more firmly stated in the case of Centre for Child Law v Minister of 
Justice and Constitutional Development and Others,143 by Yacoob J, when he 
stated that: 
 
"The advent of our constitutional democracy with the principle of the 
supremacy of the Constitution that it introduced requires a fundamental 
change to the way in which the task of statutory interpretation is carried 
out. The effect of the supremacy of the Constitution is that the 
Constitution (and every provision of it) permeates the law to every 
corner. In 'one fell swoop' our supreme law brought about a decisive 
transformation of our legal system and the way we interpret statutes. 
To borrow a phrase, 'it was no longer going to be business as usual' - 
that business being the statute as the starting point. The starting point 
is no longer the statute but the Constitution itself. This means the 
starting point is no longer what the statutory provision says but what 
the Constitution says."144 
 
For the purposes of interpreting section 227, what these dicta tell us, is that it 
must be interpreted in line with the Constitution. The above quote should not 
be interpreted to mean that the ordinary meaning is not still the place to start. 
To interpret it that way would mean that all legislative interpretation will 
                                                 
139 Investigating Directorate: Serious Economic Offences and Others v Hyundai Motor Distributors 
(Pty) Ltd and Others: In re Hyundai Motor Distributors (Pty) Ltd v Smit NO 2001 SA 545 (CC); 2000 
(2) SACR 348 CC at para 23. 
140 Ibid. 
141 2000 (4) SA 1078 (CC). 
142 2009 (2) SA 1 (CC). 
143 2009 (6) SA 632 (CC). 
144 Supra note 143 at para 107. 
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become a constitutional matter. Furthermore, in order to determine how the 
legislation ought to be read to bring it in line with constitutional values, it is 
necessary to first determine what it means in the ordinary, literal translation. If 
this meaning does not accord with a constitutional meaning, then it must be 
determined if it can be read in a way that does comply with constitutional 
standards. 
 
Thus, section 227 will be interpreted in the following way: firstly, the literal 
meaning of each subsection will be described. Where an ambiguity arises, or 
where the ordinary meaning from the words results in a problem, it will be 
determined whether there is a constitutionally-compliant way to read the 
subsection without challenging its constitutionality. 
 
 
6.1. The Provisions of Section 227 
 
6.1.1. Subsection (1) 
 
(1) Evidence as to the character of the accused or as to the character 
of any person against or in connection with whom a sexual offence 
as contemplated in the Criminal Law (Sexual Offences and Related 
Matters) Amendment Act, 2007, is alleged to have been committed, 
shall, subject to the provisions of subsection (2), be admissible or 
inadmissible if such evidence would have been admissible or 
inadmissible on the 30th day of May, 1961. 
 
Section 227(1), for all intents and purposes, maintains the approach to 
character evidence as was the position at common law. This means that the 
primary test for character evidence is relevance. According to subsection (1), 
if the character evidence would have been admissible on 30 May 1961, then it 
would be admissible now. 
 
There are two categories of character evidence, namely, evidence of general 
reputation and evidence of a general disposition to think or act in a particular 
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way.145 The law of evidence does not place an emphasis on the importance of 
evidence of general reputation, however, under South African law, disposition 
evidence is often considered relevant because it may be an indicator of future 
conduct.146 On the other hand, disposition evidence can be dangerous 
because of the prejudice that would arise from relying on past behaviour to 
determine the accuracy of the claim before the court at present. 
 
The general rule is that a complainant can be cross-examined in order to 
expose her credibility, or lack thereof. However, evidence as to character or 
the general disposition of the complainant was not considered relevant to 
credibility.147 An exception to this rule was that when the matter related to a 
sexual offence, evidence as to the complainant’s bad reputation for lack of 
chastity was allowed to be adduced.148 
 
The admissibility of bad reputation for lack of chastity has been removed from 
our law by the enactment of section 227 in 1989 as well as its amendment in 
2007. Evidence related to lack of chastity would be included in “prior sexual 
experience or conduct” as contemplated in section 227(2). The problem is that 
section 227 does not define what kind of character evidence is admissible or 
not admissible. The only indication of limitation is the words “subject to the 
provisions of subsection (2)”. This means that character evidence related to or 
stemming from a complainant’s prior sexual history would be inadmissible 
unless a court specifically allowed it after application was made under section 
227. Thus, for example, character evidence that a complainant consented to 
every offer of sexual intercourse ever given to her would not be admissible 
under subsection (1) because it elicits prior sexual history evidence. 
Application to have this evidence admitted would have to be made under 
subsection (2). 
 
But there are other matters of character that were admissible in the past, that 
are still admitted now. The problem is that certain kinds of character evidence 
                                                 
145 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 59. 
146 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 59. 
147 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 65. 
148 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 65-66. 
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gets admitted because it is considered ‘normal’ to admit it. However, it is very 
dangerous, because it is not properly admitted as character evidence but 
inferences as to a complainant’s character are made. These inferences as to 
negative aspects of a complainant’s character stem from myths surrounding 
the area of sexual offences. An example is questioning the complainant about 
why she was out alone at night, or why she was at a bar in a bad part of town. 
The amount of makeup a woman was wearing at the time of the incident is an 
issue that is often raised by the defence. The purpose of distorting the image 
of the complainant is to create the impression that the complainant was 
dressed provocatively and therefore partly at fault for the incident.149 These 
kinds of questions make inferences about the ‘decency’ of a woman, and 
often are highly prejudicial. 
 
Stereotypically, a woman who is single, unmarried or is a single parent is 
seen as unrespectable.150 These labels can also imply that a woman is 
promiscuous. By implying that the complainant is unrespectable, her 
credibility is cast into suspicion.151 Instead of focusing on the sexual character 
of the accused, the character of the complainant is focused on, cloaking the 
true issue at stake in the trial: the guilt of the accused. 
 
The consumption of alcohol is a common means of discrediting a rape 
complainant. For women, alcohol carries the taint of immorality and 
promiscuity.152 A complainant’s alcohol consumption is used in two ways to 
discredit her. The first is to suggest that alcohol unleashes a woman’s 
sexuality and lowers her inhibitions.153 The second is to imply that a woman 
under the influence of alcohol is more likely to act vindictively and lay a false 
charge.154 Both of these means suggest that it is likely that the complainant 
consented to the sexual advances of the accused, and that it was not 
unwelcome by the complainant at the time. 
 
                                                 
149 Sue Lees Carnal Knowledge: Rape on Trial (2002) at 141. 
150 Lees (note 149) at 133. 
151 Lees (note 149) at 142. 
152 Lees (note 149) at 145. 
153 Lees (note 149) at 145. 
154 Lees (note 149) at 146. 
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Another issue which sometimes falls by the wayside is that of the appearance 
of the complainant. This kind of evidence is often admitted without a problem, 
as it is not properly understood by presiding officers as character evidence. 
Attorneys are therefore able to allow inferences to be made, just by how a 
sexual offence complainant was dressed. This kind of evidence is considered 
not to be important enough to require application to the court to have it 
admitted. However, whether consciously or not, it is widely accepted that 
“appearances have meanings”,155 and are crucial in how people get judged, 
even during the criminal justice process.156 
 
It is undeniable that the appearance of a witness or the accused at the trial 
can often sway the presiding officer’s mind as to general credibility. It is not 
inconceivable, therefore that hearing an account of the complainant’s 
appearance at the time of the incident may hold similar strength in the mind of 
the presiding officer in reaching a decision. When clothing items of the victim 
are introduced as evidence in a rape trial, legal rules of evidence are drawn 
on, as well as cultural meanings of dress in determining its relevance.157 The 
intention of the complainant in dressing in a particular way is inferred from the 
kind of clothing worn.158 
 
Many people, including presiding officers believe that by a woman dressing 
provocatively in public, she is inviting an attack through her appearance. A 
woman is considered at least partially responsible for being raped if she was 
wearing revealing clothing.159 This means that the perpetrator is then judged 
as less morally and criminally blameworthy. During cross-examination, a 
complainant is often asked to describe her underwear at the time of the 
alleged incident,160 the inference being that sexy underwear means that the 
complainant must have intended to have sexual intercourse. 
                                                 
155 Chen Shen Study: From Attribution and Thought-Process Theory to Rape Shield Laws: The 
Meaning of Victim’s Appearance in Rape Trials (2003) Journal of Law and Family Studies 5 at 435. 
156 Sue Lees (note 149) at 133. 
157 Shen (note 155) at 436. 
158 Shen (note 155) at 444. 
159 Temkin and Krahe (note 21) at 33. Barbara Allen Babcock et al Sex Discrimination and the Law: 
History, Practice, and Theory 2nd ed (1996) at 1410. 
160 Lees (note 149) at 139. 
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Although evidence as to appearance might not seem as essential to prevent 
as evidence related to past sexual encounters, in practice its effect is 
substantial. For example, in the Zuma case,161 there was much reference 
made of the fact that the complainant was attired in a “kanga with no 
underwear”.162 The accused’s daughter testified that the complainant was 
dressed inappropriately.163 The way the complainant was dressed, albeit not 
in isolation, was certainly a factor which the court took into account in 
determining that the complainant was not a credible witness. 
 
The problem is that even though evidence of general reputation ought not to 
be admitted as relevant, sexual character and past sexual history are used as 
indicators of a complainant’s reputation.164 It seems then that the lack of 
guidelines as to what types of character evidence is a problem. The common 
law is not the best place to look for guidance, since the old common law 
position with regard to character evidence is somewhat restricted by section 
227. The common law also has a history of prejudice against women 
complainants in particular, and making use of it as a standard would perhaps 
not achieve the purpose of the amendments in section 227 to bring the law in 
line with our constitutional dispensation. 
 
 
6.1.2. Subsection (2) 
 
Section 277(2) reads as follows: 
 
"No evidence as to any previous sexual experience or conduct of any 
person against or in connection with whom a sexual offence is alleged 
to have been committed, other than evidence relating to sexual 
experience or conduct in respect of the offence which is being tried, 
shall be adduced, and no evidence or question in cross examination 
regarding such sexual experience or conduct, shall be put to such 
                                                 
161 2006 (2) SACR 191 (W). 
162 Supra note 161 at 217.  
163 Supra note 161 at 217. 
164 Lees (note 149) at 131. 
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person, the accused or any other witness at the proceedings pending 
before the court unless— 
(a)  the court has, on application by a party to the proceedings, 
granted leave to adduce such evidence or to put such question; 
or 
(b)  such evidence has been introduced by the prosecution." 
 
The simple language of the provision indicates that there are four basic 
elements involved in the provision: the subjects of the provision, the object of 
the provision, the prohibited acts, and the actual nature of the acts in 
question. 
 
The subject of the provision is the legal representatives or an un-represented 
accused themselves in the context of a sexual offences case; the object of the 
provision is a witness to the alleged sexual offence who gives testimonial 
evidence in court; the acts that the legal representatives for the defence are 
prohibited from performing are the "adduc[ing]… [of] evidence" or the posing 
of "question[s] in cross examination" to a witness in a sexual offences case 
without the permission of the court or the prior conduct of the prosecution, the 
nature of the "evidence" or "question" that evidence or question relates to 
prior "sexual experience or conduct" of the witness. 
 
The "plain words" used in sub-section 227(2) of the CPA when accorded their 
ordinary meaning do not appear to disclose any absurdity or ambiguity 
contrary to the purpose of protecting the complainant acting as witness, which 
is clearly the intention of the drafters. 
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6.1.3. Subsection (5) 
 
Subsection (5) reads as follows: 
 
(5) In determining whether evidence or questioning as contemplated in 
this section is relevant to the proceedings before the court, the court 
shall take into account whether such evidence or questioning – 
(a) is in the interests of justice, with due regard to the accused’s right 
to a fair trial; 
(b) is in the interests of society in encouraging the reporting of sexual 
offences; 
(c) relates to a specific instance of sexual activity relevant to a fact in 
issue; 
(d) is likely to rebut evidence previously adduced by the prosecution; 
(e) is fundamental to the accused’s defence; 
(f) is not substantially outweighed by its potential prejudice to the 
complainant’s personal dignity and right to privacy; or 
(g) is likely to explain the presence of semen or the source of 
pregnancy or disease or any injury to the complainant, where it is 
relevant to a fact in issue. 
 
Section 227(5) instructs that when a court is determining whether prior sexual 
history evidence is relevant or not, the court “shall” take the outlined factors 
into account. “Shall” constitutes mandatory language, which means that a 
court must consider the factors that are outlined. 
 
Such an approach was criticised in the past for devising categories which 
would leave open situations which have not been foreseen, and therefore 
evade the recognised categories.165 However, the factors are extremely useful 
as they make mandatory the considerations that have to be considered in 
determining the relevance of the evidence or questioning.166 
 
                                                 
165 Du Toit (note 44) at 24-100D. 
166 Du Toit (note 44) at 24-100D. 
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This justification leads to another potential criticism that can be levelled 
against subsection (5). That is, that it constrains judicial discretion in 
determining whether evidence is relevant or not, particularly because it makes 
use of mandatory language. 
 
It is clear that the factors as set out in section 227(5) do need to be 
considered by a court. However, there is nothing to suggest that it is a closed 
list. A set of guidelines do not displace judicial discretion, but rather guides it. 
The considerations listed are the sort of factors a court ought to take into 
account in any event. The evidence apparent from case law is that presiding 
officers did not properly exercise their discretion in determining the relevance 
and admissibility of prior sexual history evidence.167 
 
The Legislature chose to adopt an approach that did not entirely prohibit prior 
sexual history evidence, since this could have the effect of eliminating 
relevant evidence that is necessary to the defence of an accused. Hence, it 
chose to uphold the right to adduce and challenge evidence, and by 
extension, the accused’s right to a fair trial. 
 
On the other hand, it recognised the danger in leaving the determination of 
relevance entirely in the hands of judicial officers. A balanced approach is to 
set out a list of the circumstances in which prior sexual history evidence is 
admissible, while still leaving it to judicial discretion on a case-by-case basis. 
There is no substantial infringement of judicial discretion. The ultimate 
decision of the admissibility of evidence lies with the presiding officer. This is 
not an undue constrain or limitation on judicial discretion, and therefore does 
not raise any problems, constitutional or otherwise. 
 
It is necessary to consider how these factors are meant to be read. Even if it 
is assumed that all the factors have to be considered, it is clear that the rights 
of the accused will have to take precedence. Thus, the policy reasons behind 
encouraging reporting and minimising secondary victimisation of the 
                                                 
167 S v Balhuber 1987 (1) PH H22 (A); S v N 1988 (3) SA 450 (A); S v M 2002 (2) SACR 411. 
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complainant cannot be used to override the constitutionally enshrined right of 
an accused to a fair trial.168 
 
It is submitted that on a correct reading of subsection (5), not all the factors 
need to be read together. Only one of the following factors need be fulfilled: 
paragraph (a), it is in the interests of justice, with due regard to the accused’s 
right to a fair trial; paragraph (c), relates to a specific instance of sexual 
activity relevant to a fact in issue; paragraph (d), is likely to rebut evidence 
previously adduced by the prosecution; paragraph (e), is fundamental to the 
accused’s defence; and paragraph (g), is likely to explain the presence of 
semen or the source of pregnancy or disease or any injury to the complainant, 
where it is relevant to a fact in issue. 
 
Paragraph (b), is in the interests of society in encouraging the reporting of 
sexual offences, and (f), is not substantially outweighed by its potential 
prejudice to the complainant’s personal dignity and right to privacy, can then 
be used to test the probative value of the evidence that is sought to be 
adduced. In some cases it will be clear that the evidence is relevant. Thus, for 
example, where a complainant alleges that the accused raped her and she 
contracted HIV, it is logical that evidence that her sexual partner is HIV 
positive would be admissible to rebut such evidence, and it would be 
unnecessary to consider either paragraph (b) or (f) in reaching that decision. It 
depends on the scenario in each case individually. 
 
There is a danger that the circumstances which go beyond the ordinary 
‘probative value versus prejudice’ test may disallow evidence that could be 
necessary to render the trial fair.169 Examples of these factors are paragraphs 
(b) and (f), which bring into consideration socio-political considerations and 
the competing rights of the complainant. However, since there can be no 
competing interest that can trump the imperative of avoiding a wrong 
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conviction, there is no material harm in including factors outside of the 
common law test for relevance.170 
 
Thus, subsection (5) presents no potential constitutional challenges. By 
reading the list of factors as an open list which does not unduly restrict judicial 
discretion, and by allowing an understanding that each circumstance can be 
considered on its own, without having to consider all of them and pit the 
interests of the accused against the complainant in each and every case, it is 
apparent that subsection (5) would pass constitutional muster. 
 
 
6.1.4. Subsection (6) 
 
Subsection (6) contains the following provision: 
 
“The court shall not grant an application referred to in subsection 2(a) 
if, in its opinion, such evidence or questioning is sought to be adduced 
to support an inference that by reason of the sexual nature of the 
complainant’s experience or conduct, the complainant- 
(a)  is more likely to have consented to the offence being tried; or 
(b)  is less worthy of belief.” 
 
On the plain meaning of this section, it is noticeable that the discretion 
available to the judicial officer only extends so far as to determine the purpose 
for which the evidence is sought to be tendered or questioned. Once such a 
purpose has been found to fall under section 227(6)(a) or (b), there is no 
discretion available to the judicial officer. He is forced to exclude the evidence. 
This has the effect of creating an exclusionary rule.171 
 
It seems that the evidence is inadmissible because of the purpose for which 
the evidence or questioning is sought to be adduced, and does not consider 
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how the court itself would use the evidence.172 Thus, a court cannot consider 
the probative value for any other permissible inference.173 However, it is 
difficult to think of a scenario in which some other inference, which did not fit 
under the listed factors in subsection (5), would otherwise be admissible were 
it not for subsection (6). Propensity reasoning is generally inadmissible, and 
there seems no reason why it ought to be allowed in sexual offence cases. 
 
It is contended that the use of the word “support” has the effect of widening 
the ambit of the apparent exclusionary rule.174 This means that even where 
the evidence or questioning would form part of a larger set of evidence which 
the court would consider together, and not just where the evidence or 
questioning is sought to establish the inference, the evidence or questioning is 
excluded.175 Thus, even where there may be a range of evidence to support 
the inference, the evidence or questioning regarding prior sexual history will 
be inadmissible. 
 
Exclusion of inferential evidence in the scenario explained above is logical 
and legally sound. If there are other pieces of relevant evidence available to 
point to an inference, then the court ought to make use of those without 
relying on otherwise inadmissible evidence to assist in making a judgment 
about the possibility of a complainant having consented or a complainant’s 
believability. On the other hand, if it is the only piece of evidence available 
upon which an inference as to consent or believability can be drawn, then it 
should definitely be inadmissible, as its prejudice to the complainant clearly 
outweighs its probative value. Section 227 was enacted in order to prevent 
these very inference-based conclusions being drawn. 
 
It has been argued that the use of the words “by reason of the sexual nature 
of the complainant’s sexual experience or conduct” and not the words “by 
reasons only” opens up an ambiguity. It is unclear whether the court ought to 
refuse to admit the evidence if it is to support an inference that the 
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complainant is more likely to have consented or less worthy of belief, by 
reason of the sexual nature of the offence, or some other aspect of the 
evidence that has nothing to do with the sexual nature.176 It is not clear 
whether “by reason of” is sufficiently specific to allow the implied reading of 
“only” into the section.177 
 
Subsection (6) is substantially similar to section 276(1) of the Canadian 
Criminal Code. This section has been constitutionally challenged, and has 
withstood that challenge in the case of R v Darrach.178 The Court in that case 
stated that: 
 
“The phrase ‘by reason of the sexual nature of the activity’ in section 
276 is a clarification by Parliament that it is inferences from the sexual 
nature of the activity, as opposed to inferences from other potentially 
relevant features of the activity, that are prohibited. If evidence of 
sexual activity is proferred for its non-sexual features, such as to show 
a pattern of conduct or a prior consistent statement, it may be 
permitted.”179 
 
Arguably, subsection (6) is capable of reading in the word “only”. However, 
the ambiguity outlined above is not necessarily the most problematic. Rather, 
the ambiguity that needs to be cleared up is whether this evidence can be 
adduced or questioned where it is to support the kind of inference prohibited, 
but is also for some other purpose. Therefore “only” ought to be read-in in the 
following way: “The court shall not grant an application referred to in 
subsection 2(a) if, in its opinion, such evidence or questioning is sought to be 
adduced only to support an inference that by reason of the sexual nature of 
the complainant’s experience or conduct, the complainant…” 
 
This reading ensures that evidence that is sought to be adduced or cross-
examined must be intended for some purpose other than mere propensity 
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reasoning. Subsection (6), therefore, does not restrict subsection (5). Only 
where there is no purpose other than to show that the complainant is more 
likely to have consented or is less worthy of belief will the application be 
refused. 
 
There is evidence to suggest that the courts will read subsection (6) in this 
way. In the Zuma case,180 the court allowed evidence of the complainant’s 
history of having (allegedly) falsely accused men of rape in the past. Although 
the 2007 amendment was not yet in force, the learned Judge in the case did 
consider it, albeit not in-depth. The effect of the evidence would clearly 
support an inference that the complainant was less worthy of belief. However, 
it was also perceived as necessary to the accused’s defence. Therefore, it 
can be seen that where there is another reason besides the support of an 
inference as contemplated in subsection (6), the evidence sought to be 
adduced or questioned does not fall under the ‘exclusionary rule’. 
 
Similarly, in R v M,181 evidence from a male witness regarding the 
complainant’s approach to sexual intercourse was admitted. The evidence 
was tendered to rebut the prosecution’s claim that she was rendered asexual 
as a result of an operation. It is true that this evidence would support an 
inference that, by reason of the sexual nature of the complainant’s conduct, 
she was less likely to have withheld her consent and was less worthy of belief. 
However, it was clearly also tendered to rebut evidence raised by the 
prosecution. This is allowed under section 227(5)(d), and therefore even 
under the current section 227 this evidence would not be excluded. There 
would be no grave injustice to the accused and would not have led to an 
unfair trial. 
 
It is suggested that subsection (6) was drafted because it was envisaged that 
it would render inadmissible evidence that is in fact relevant.182 If the correct 
understanding of the purpose of section 227 is remembered, it is possible to 
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read the purpose of subsection (6) entirely differently. Section 227 was 
enacted largely because it was clear that sexual offence complainants were 
not being properly treated by the court, in that evidence that was irrelevant 
was allowed to be adduced or at least open to cross-examination. This trend 
comes from a long history of prejudice against the sexual autonomy of 
women. The 1989 enactment of the rape shield provision was found to be 
insufficient to curb judicial misuse of its discretion. Section 227 was therefore 
enacted to ensure that a similar pattern was not maintained. 
 
Against this backdrop, it becomes clear that subsection (6) serves to prevent 
propensity and inferential reasoning being used to sway the court against the 
complainant, where such propensity and inference is the only purpose behind 
its adducement. The accused’s innocence and fair trial rights generally are not 
put in danger, since this kind of reasoning is ordinarily inadmissible in any 
event. If there is some other reason besides an inference being drawn, the 
court will consider such a purpose under subsection (5) and it no longer falls 
under the ‘exclusionary rule’ arguably created under subsection (6). 
 
Another criticism which can be levelled against this section, as well as 
subsection (2), is that in the situation where the accused and the complainant 
were involved in a relationship, either in the past or immediately preceding the 
alleged incident, evidence as to their sexual history is inadmissible without 
leave from the court. Many people would argue that evidence of a past sexual 
relationship is always relevant and admissible. 
 
There may be circumstances in which the evidence is relevant. Such 
circumstances may include the presence of semen on clothing, or pregnancy. 
However, this is already an accepted exclusion to the general admissibility 
under subsection 5(g). Another reason for its relevance may be that the 
accused genuinely and reasonably believed that the complainant had 
consented. For instance, the parties may have had an understanding that a 
message asking the other to come over was always an offer of sexual 
intercourse. Such evidence may be necessary to show that the accused did 
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believe that there was consent. However, this is also provided for in 
subsection 5(e), in that it is fundamental to the accused’s defence. 
 
It cannot be upheld that evidence of a past sexual relationship between the 
accused and the complainant is always relevant. At most, this points only to a 
propensity to engage in sexual intercourse with the accused, which is an 
inference prohibited by subsection 6(a). Furthermore, if evidence of a sexual 
relationship was always admissible, this would have the effect of negatively 
affecting those complainants who are raped by their boyfriends or 
husbands,183 because it would always create the assumption that the 
complainant did consent, or that the accused believed that she did consent. 
The former is prohibited, and the latter has to be proven after application to 
admit it is made in terms of subsection (2). Evidence related to a past 
relationship between the parties has no bearing on the truth of the allegation 
before the court at present, unless it can be shown that it is relevant according 
to one of the factors contained in subsection (5). Therefore, expecting the 
accused in such a situation to make application to the court before being able 
to adduce such evidence or question the complainant accordingly is not 
unreasonable. 
 
Section 227 does not limit an accused’s right to adduce and challenge 
evidence. Prior sexual history evidence is generally irrelevant and detracts 
from the truth-finding mandate of the court. The restriction on the kind of 
evidence that may be adduced or cross-examined does not infringe the scope 
of section 35(3)(i). Where such evidence is necessary to ensure that the trial 
is fair, the evidence is admissible if it falls under one of the factors under 
subsection (5). This is sufficient to maintain the fair trial rights of the accused, 
while ensuring that the complainant is protected from unnecessary humiliation 
and only relevant evidence is placed before the court. 
 
Although the conclusion herein is that section 227 does not restrict the right to 
adduce and challenge evidence, it is necessary to undertake a limitations 
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analysis in order to ensure that the arguments posited are thorough and will 
rise to potential challenges levelled by critics. The paper will turn to the 
limitations stage of the analysis, in order to determine whether the limitation 
created by section 227 can be justified under section 36 of the Constitution. 
 
 
7. The Limitations Analysis 
 
7.1. Law of General Application 
 
Any law that limits a right in the Constitution infringes the right. However, the 
infringement is not unconstitutional if the reason for its limitation is an 
acceptable justification.184 It is not sufficient that the limitation is to serve 
general welfare, rather the limitation must serve a purpose that is 
compelling.185 Moreover, there must be a good likelihood that the limitation 
will achieve the purpose it is meant to achieve, and that there is no other way 
of achieving the purpose without the right being restricted.186 
 
In order to determine whether section 227 is an unjustifiable limitation on an 
accused’s right to challenge and adduce evidence as entrenched in section 
35(3)(i) of the Constitution, an inquiry in terms of section 36 will be conducted. 
 
Section 36 of the Constitution reads as follows: 
 
(1) The rights in the Bill of Rights may be limited only in terms of general 
application to the extent that the limitation is reasonable and justifiable 
in an open and democratic society based on human dignity, equality 
and freedom, taking into account all relevant factors, including – 
(a) the nature of the right; 
(b) the importance of the purpose of the limitation; 
(c) the nature and extent of the limitation; 
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(d) the relation between the limitation and its purpose; and 
(e) less restrictive means to achieve the purpose. 
 
The first question that must be answered under section 36 is whether the law 
that potentially limits a constitutional right is a ‘law of general application’. This 
means that the limitation must be authorised by law, and must apply 
generally.187 
 
The requirement of authority derives from the rule of law, which encapsulates 
the notion that the authority of the government derives from the law.188 All 
forms of legislation, the common law and customary law, 189  and exercises of 
judicial rule-making authorised by the Constitution,190 qualify as ‘law’. Since 
we are dealing with a provision contained in original legislation, it is clear that 
the limitation is ‘authorised by law’. 
 
The second part of the initial inquiry is whether the law is of general 
application. This means that the law must be sufficiently clear, accessible and 
precise, and on a substantive level it must apply equally and must not be 
arbitrary in its application.191 Equal application means that it cannot apply only 
to a group of individuals. 
 
Although section 227 does not apply to “everyone” in the generous sense of 
the word, it does apply to any accused wanting to adduce or challenge 
evidence in a sexual offence case. Further, section 227 does include 
guidelines to constrain judicial discretion. In this sense, it applies equally to all 
such accused persons, allowing that like cases are treated alike. 
 
The second question under a section 36 analysis, involves whether the 
limitation is ‘reasonable and justifiable in an open and democratic society 
based on human dignity, equality and freedom’. 
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7.2. Is the Limitation ‘Reasonable and Justifiable’? 
 
The Constitutional Court in S v Makwanyane,192 described the analysis that 
must be undertaken under the limitations analysis of the Interim Constitution, 
section 33, which is equally relevant to the inquiry under section 36 of the 
Final Constitution: 
 
“The limitation of constitutional rights for a purpose that is reasonable 
and necessary in a democratic society involves the weighing up of 
competing values and ultimately an assessment based on 
proportionality… In the balancing process, the relevant considerations 
will include the nature of the right that is limited, and its importance to 
an open an democratic society based on freedom and equality; the 
purpose for which the right is limited and the importance of that 
purpose to such a society; the extent of the limitation, its efficacy, and 
particularly where the limitation has to be necessary, whether the 
desired ends could reasonably be achieved through other means less 
damaging to the right in question.”193 
 
The Court outlined the inquiry as one of proportionality, which corresponds to 
the factors outlined in section 36(1)(a)-(e). These factors are not a closed list 
of what must be considered under a limitations analysis, but are merely 
indications of whether a limitation is reasonable and justifiable.194 Each of 
these factors will be individually considered with specific reference to section 
227 and the accused’s rights to a fair trial. A separate limitations inquiry will 
be conducted for the general challenge to section 227, and the challenge to 
subsection (6) specifically, beginning with the general challenge to section 
227. 
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7.3. The Justifiability of Section 227 in General 
 
Section 36(1)(a): the nature of the right 
 
The nature of the right to adduce and challenge evidence forms part of the 
larger right to a fair trial. 
 
It has been argued that the accused should have more liberal rights than the 
prosecution to adduce evidence which may not be of high probative value.195 
There is some truth in this, especially in light of the fact that the Constitution 
enshrines the rights of the accused to a fair trial. 
 
However, the right to adduce and challenge evidence does not extend to 
irrelevant evidence.196 There is no unqualified right to adduce irrelevant 
evidence or challenge admissible evidence with irrelevant evidence, and this 
limitation is justifiable in terms of section 36 of the Constitution.197 
But there remains some reasonableness in the argument that where there is 
limited probative value, evidence that would normally be inadmissible on 
account of irrelevance, ought to be admissible in order to protect the 
accused’s right to a fair trial.198 
 
This kind of argument does not extend to allowing prior sexual history 
evidence in order to show that the complainant has a propensity to act in a 
certain way or to engage in sexual intercourse with a number of persons. 
Such evidence is irrelevant, and therefore inadmissible. The accused’s right to 
a fair trial cannot be used to make admissible evidence that is irrelevant if 
there is no, or little, probative value. Thus, for example, evidence that a 
complainant had intercourse with five men in five days to show that on the 
sixth day she probably consented to the sixth man (the accused) has no 
probative value at all. On the other hand, evidence that the accused had 
reason to believe that the complainant was consenting because that was how 
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she often agreed to intercourse with other men, which was well-known to 
various people including the accused, might not have substantial probative 
value, but might nonetheless be admitted in order to protect an accused’s fair 
trial rights. 
 
Even if one were to argue that all relevant information must be put before a 
court in order to ensure that justice is served,199 admitting prior sexual history 
evidence in any form would not achieve justice. Collateral issues add 
confusion to the court, cloud the actual issues and extend the length and cost 
of trial. Furthermore, it is necessary for the administration of justice that all 
relevant evidence is admitted. Unless the evidence is found to be relevant 
because of its purpose, it cannot assist the court’s fact-finding function. 
 
Thus, there is no right to adduce irrelevant evidence or challenge evidence 
with irrelevant questioning. 
 
Section 36(1)(b): the importance of the purpose of the limitation 
 
The purpose must be one that is worthwhile and important in an open and 
democratic society based on human dignity, equality and freedom.200 
 
At the core of the purpose of rape shield laws, lies the protection of the dignity 
and privacy of a sexual offence complainant. Section 10 of the Constitution 
guarantees every person the right to have their dignity respected.201 It is 
unavoidable that a person who charges another with a crime will have to face 
gruelling questioning and cross-examination in order to assist the court with 
its fact-finding mandate, as well as to test the complainant’s version of events 
and ensure that the accused is given a fair trial. However, this does not mean 
that the complainant should be subjected to unfair and harsh questioning 
which is aimed solely at reducing her credibility, and hence, her dignity. 
 
                                                 
199 Schwikkard in Jagwanath (note 30) at 204. 
200 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 179. 
201 “Everyone has inherent dignity and the right to have their dignity respected and protected.”  
 61 
When a complainant testifies to a sexual offence, a certain amount of her 
privacy has to be made public, at least to those in the courtroom. She will be 
asked to describe her relationship with the accused, the exact details of the 
incident, what genital organs were involved and the effect of the incident on 
her general psyche and state of mind. These infringements on her privacy are 
necessary for the same reasons as outlined above. However, the infringement 
on a sexual offence complainant’s privacy ought not to extend to other 
personal information related to her sex life that is not relevant or necessary to 
the incident in question. Thus, section 227 protects the constitutionally 
entrenched right to dignity and privacy of a sexual offence complainant. 
 
As mentioned earlier,202 there are a number of legislative objectives behind 
the enactment of a rape shield law. These objectives will be discussed in 
detail in order to assist with the determination of the importance of the 
purpose of the limitation. 
 
 
 Preventing secondary victimisation of the complainant 
 
Testifying in a room full of strangers, including one’s (alleged) attacker is an 
ordeal in and of itself.203 The complainant is expected to recount the details of 
the alleged sexual offence, to describe hers and the accused’s body parts, the 
context and surroundings. Under cross-examination, the victim is severely 
questioned about her own conduct leading up to the alleged sexual assault, 
her own enjoyment of the sexual experience, and is accused of lying about 
the identity of the perpetrator or of her own acquiescence to the sexual 
experience. Overall, the court experience for a victim of a sexual offence is 
intimidating, humiliating and degrading.204 
 
If a complainant is subjected to questioning about her past sexual history, 
which has no ties to the sexual offence in question, the humiliation the 
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complainant will experience is ten-fold.205 Further victimisation is experienced 
if such questioning is allowed and it influences the presiding officer’s mind,206 
whether consciously or not, about her believability in the present context. This 
victimisation is blatantly unfair and infringes the complainant’s right to dignity 
and privacy. 
 
 
 To encourage reporting 
 
Only a very small percentage of women report rapes to the police.207 Although 
reporting rape can bring social, medical and financial services, it can also 
complicate the healing process.208 In sexual cases in particular, the events 
are obviously already traumatic and sexually sensitive, and testifying in open 
court will cause further emotional and psychological harm to the 
complainant.209 
 
There are many reasons why women choose not to report sexual crimes, for 
example, lack of confidence in the police, confusion as to whether the 
experience actually constitutes an offence, fear of the perpetrator, to name 
but a few. But at least some women fail to report because of fear of having 
their past sexual experiences being brought to light in court.210 
 
In the case of S v Staggie,211 it was held that greater assistance ought to be 
provided for women who report sexual offences, as this would encourage 
more women to report sexual offences and become witnesses in these 
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proceedings if they saw that they would be protected from wide-scale 
humiliation and embarrassment.212 
If women know that they are less likely to come under attack and have their 
sexual histories revealed to the public at large, then they will be more willing 
to report sexual offences. If even this one factor could be curtailed, many 
more women would feel more at ease with reporting an offence. 
 
 
 To promote the administration of justice 
 
It cannot be reasonably argued that justice is served if a victim of a sexual 
offence becomes so distraught that she is unable to give effective 
testimony.213 More dangerous to the rule of law, is if her constitutional rights 
are not properly respected. In the case of S v Mothopeng,214 it was held that it 
is for the proper administration of justice that witnesses should not feel the 
fear of retribution if choosing to testify. 
 
If irrelevant evidence is allowed, merely to ensure that the accused is able to 
make any and every defence he can, at the expense of the complainant’s 
constitutional rights, justice is not being served. 
 
 
 To change attitudes to sexual offences 
 
Much of the history of prejudice against women is carried over from the 
common law cautionary rule and the perception of women as less believable. 
Women who are raped are often believed to have deserved it or asked for 
it,215 or needed it.216 Changing how a complainant’s prior sexual history is 
dealt with in court can go a long way in reforming society’s views of women 
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who have been the victim of sexual offences and how society views women in 
general terms. 
 
Since a large number of sexual offences cases that make it through to the trial 
stage turn on whether or not there was consent, it is this factor that is most 
important, and which needs to be protected from unfair inference. 
 
“So what if a woman might have had sex with 60 men, 4 times a night 
for the past five years, what’s that got to do with whether she 
consented to these three accused on this night…?”217 
 
This is precisely the purpose of Section 227, to reduce the kind of inferential 
reasoning that a woman is likely to have consented because of sexual 
promiscuity in her past. This kind of prejudice perpetuates the fallacy that rape 
can be justifiable.218 
It is clear that rape shield laws such as section 227 of the Criminal Procedure 
Act can play a vital role in the protection of the complainant and for the proper 
administration of justice. 
 
 
Section 36(1)(c): the nature and extent of the limitation 
 
This factor is an important part of the proportionality requirement, because 
proportionality requires that the infringement must not be more extensive than 
is warranted by the purpose that the limitation seeks to achieve.219 Therefore, 
it is necessary to determine what the extent or seriousness of the infringement 
is. 
 
The common law states that irrelevant evidence is inadmissible. This rule is 
statutorily confirmed in section 210 of the Criminal Procedure Act, which 
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provides that only evidence that is relevant and material to conduce or prove 
or disprove any point or fact in issue is admissible.220 
 
The rationale for the exclusion of irrelevant evidence is succinctly described: 
 
“Because the purpose of evidence is to establish the probability of the 
facts upon which the success of a party’s case depends in law, 
evidence must be confined to the proof of facts which are required for 
that purpose. The proof of supernumerary or unrelated facts will not 
assist the court, and may in certain cases prejudice the court against a 
party, while having no probative value on the issues actually before 
it.”221 
 
Evidence is relevant if when considered alone or alongside other facts render 
the issues which have to be proved, more or less probable.222 However, 
relevance is not the only test for admissibility. The general rule is that relevant 
evidence is admissible unless there is another rule of evidence which 
excludes it.223 In the case of S v Shabalala,224 it was said that if the weight of 
evidence “is so inconsequential and the relevance accordingly so 
problematical, there can be little point in receiving the evidence…”225 
 
For the purposes of this paper, an important factor to consider is the 
admissibility of evidence which has the potential to prejudice a party. The 
general rule is that evidence is irrelevant if its prejudicial effect outweighs its 
probative value.226 
 
As already argued elsewhere in this paper, evidence as to the prior sexual 
history of the complainant is generally irrelevant since it does not assist the 
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court in proving any issue at stake. Therefore, the evidence ought to be 
inadmissible for its irrelevance. 
 
At most, prior sexual history evidence establishes a propensity to have sexual 
intercourse or otherwise engage in sexual conduct. If this evidence is allowed, 
its probative value is clearly outweighed by the prejudice to the complainant. 
 
Thus, section 227 does not change the general rules of the law of evidence in 
any substantial or material way. Rather, it simply cements the general rules of 
evidence with regards to admissibility, and even constructs the circumstances 
in which the prior sexual history evidence is relevant and hence admissible. 
 
One might then ask why section 227 is necessary at all. The answer to this 
question is two-fold. Firstly, there is sufficient evidence in case law to show 
that judicial officers did not exclude prior sexual evidence even where it was 
clearly irrelevant.227 Secondly, because of the very personal nature of sexual 
offences228 and the history of prejudice against women, the general rules of 
relevancy often appear unclear in the area of sexual conduct. It is therefore 
necessary to have a specific rule that applies to sexual offences and ensures 
that there are clear guidelines and restrictions on judicial discretion. 
 
Furthermore, the restriction on sexual history evidence is not a complete 
prohibition. There remains a large element of judicial discretion, and there is 
room for flexibility in determining whether admission of prior sexual evidence 
of the complainant is necessary to protect the fair trial rights of the accused. 
Therefore, the nature and extent of the limitation does not restrict the rights of 
the accused any further than is necessary, or further than it does with regard 
to any other kind of evidence, such as character evidence or similar fact 
evidence. Section 227 does not go further than it ought to, or beyond what is 
proportional. 
 
                                                 
227 S v Balhuber 1987 (1) PH H22 (A); S v N 1988 (3) SA 450 (A); S v M 2002 (2) SACR 411. 
228 Temkin and Krahe (note 21) at 33. There is no other criminal offence as closely connected to broad 
social attitudes and prejudices relating to the conduct of the victim. 
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Section 36(1)(d): the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose 
 
In order for the limitation to be reasonable, there has to be a causal 
connection between the law and its purpose.229 It has to be determined 
whether the limitation serves the purpose it purports to achieve. 
 
Section 227 has two primary purposes. Firstly, it prevents prior sexual history 
evidence being introduced where it is irrelevant. Secondly, it serves to protect 
the complainant’s dignity and privacy. 
 
Section 227 cements the general rules of evidence that irrelevant evidence is 
inadmissible. It restricts judicial discretion by providing guidelines within which 
a court can determine whether evidence is relevant or not, including the 
accused’s right to a fair trial.230 It ensures that a proper analysis of section 227 
and of the facts of the case are considered, since it requires a court to give 
reasons for its decision to allow or disallow the adducement or cross-
examination of prior sexual history evidence. Section 227 prevents collateral 
issues being placed before the court and drawing its attention away from the 
actual issues which have to be proven. 
 
By preventing irrelevant evidence that will more often than not be extremely 
prejudicial to the complainant, the dignity and privacy of the complainant is 
better protected. Further, there is protection to the complainant’s dignity 
because the ordeal of testifying and facing the accused is somewhat 
lessened, if at least her past sex life is respected as private. The dignity of the 
complainant is also respected by eliminating the possibility that the court may, 
consciously or not, draw inferences from the evidence related to prior sexual 
conduct that is raised. 
 
 
 
                                                 
229 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 183. 
230 Section 227(5)(a). 
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Section 36(1)(e): less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
 
In order to be legitimate, a limitation of a constitutional right must achieve the 
benefits that are in proportion to the costs of the limitation.231 Thus, the 
limitation will not be legitimate if less restrictive means could be used to 
achieve the same ends, such that rights will not be restricted at all or at least 
will be less restricted. However, courts ought not to second-guess the 
Legislature.232 
 
The only less restrictive means that could be used would be to revert back to 
the 1989 amendment, which made the only test relevancy. In this way, there 
was almost no restriction on the judiciary, and the accused’s rights were given 
a higher status, since any time evidence was at all relevant, even where it 
was prejudicial to the complainant, it would be admitted. 
 
However, under this approach, the purposes of section 227 would not be 
achieved. Limits on judicial discretion are important, and as long as it is not 
over-burdensome, can serve a necessary function in ensuring that the law is 
consistently applied across the judiciary.233 Because of the history of judicial 
discretion not being properly exercised to exclude irrelevant sexual history 
evidence, it is clear that section 227 is necessary to ensure that presiding 
officers properly engage with the purpose of section 227, and avoid following 
a tradition that prejudices sexual offence complainants, in particular women, 
based on their past sexual conduct. 
 
The other way would be to avoid rules that specifically deal with sexual 
offences, and rely only on the general rules of evidence. However, since here 
the primary test is again relevance, the purposes of section 227 would not be 
realised, neither to prevent irrelevant evidence from being adduced and cross-
examined, nor to protect the complainant’s fundamental rights to dignity and 
privacy. 
                                                 
231 Currie de Waal (note 70) at 183. 
232 Currie and de Waal (note 70) at 184. 
233 This is similar to the Mandatory Minimum Sentencing Legislation, which was enacted to promote 
consistency and guidelines to the judiciary in the sentencing of certain offences. 
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The Legislature did in fact prefer a less restrictive means when it drafted 
section 227. It chose not to enact a provision similar to that adopted in 
Michigan, where all cross-examination and evidence as to sexual conduct, 
except evidence related to the accused and evidence that can explain the 
presence of semen, pregnancy or disease, is prohibited.234 The Legislature 
chose a route of regulation that is less restrictive than the Michigan approach, 
allowing prior sexual history evidence in more than one instance, including 
where it is necessary for the accused’s fair trial rights,235 where it could rebut 
evidence raised by the prosecution,236 and where it is fundamental to the 
accused’s defence.237 It is clear that section 227 is not as strict as the 
Michigan formulation and does allow prior sexual history in various different 
ways. Thus, section 227 as it stands today is already a ‘less restrictive means 
to achieve the purpose’. There is no other lesser restriction that would still 
achieve the purpose of the limitation. 
 
Due to the separate challenges levelled against section 227, one as a general 
constitutional challenge, and the other as a critique of specific parts of section 
227, particularly subsection (6), a separate inquiry will be conducted 
concerning the justifiability of the limitation created by section 227(6). 
 
 
7.4. The Justifiability of Subsection (6) 
 
Section 36(1)(a): the nature of the right 
 
The nature of the right has already been discussed under the limitations 
analysis for the general challenge to the constitutionality of section 227 as a 
rape shield law. For the most part it will not be repeated in this section. 
 
                                                 
234 Anderson (note 3) at 80. 
235 Section 227(5)(a). 
236 Section 227(5)(d). 
237 Section 227(5)(e). 
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There is only one part of the scope of section 35(3)(i) that will be considered 
in more depth at this stage, and that concerns the scope of the right to 
challenge evidence, and how this accords with the right to cross-examination. 
 
Until 1989, the accused was prohibited from leading evidence of the 
complainant’s sexual relations with other men, but she was able to be 
questioned regarding this aspect during cross-examination as it was 
considered relevant to credibility.238 This is clearly not the position any longer, 
since permission of any evidence sought to be adduced or questioned during 
cross-examination has to be requested from the court. 
 
Cross-examination is not restricted to the questions covered during the 
examination-in-chief.239 However, it is less clear whether new evidence that 
will not be adduced can be raised in cross-examination. If this were allowed, it 
would mean that the attorney, who is not under oath and not a party to the 
proceedings, can raise new evidence. Further, it also means that any 
evidence could be brought into the courtroom without having to have it 
properly admitted as evidence. This would circumvent the process of having 
evidence admitted as relevant. 
 
Thus, the question is whether the right to challenge evidence in section 
35(3)(i) can reasonably be extended to include cross-examination of a 
complainant on matters of fact that will not otherwise be raised as evidence. 
 
It is submitted that the right to adduce and challenge evidence does not 
include the right of an accused to raise new evidence during cross-
examination. Thus, cross-examination relating to prior sexual history, where 
such evidence will not later be adduced, for example, by calling other 
witnesses, is not a constitutionally protected right. 
 
This is so because if cross-examination is used to support the inference that, 
for instance, the complainant is less worthy of belief, there is no way to test 
                                                 
238 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 66. 
239 Schwikkard and Van der Merwe (note 41) at 366. 
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this assertion if evidence is not adduced. If we consider the Zuma case, let us 
suppose that the defence made application to cross-examine the complainant 
about her history of alleged false rape accusations without calling other 
witnesses to present this evidence. That would mean that a clear inference 
would be drawn that she was less worthy of belief, without actual evidence 
being tendered in that regard. 
 
Section 35(3)(i) could not have been intended to constitutionally protect the 
circumventing of the ordinary rules of evidence. 
 
 
Section 36(1)(b): the importance of the purpose of the limitation 
 
The limitation in section 227(6) involves the refusal to grant an application in 
terms of subsection (2) if the evidence or line of questioning is to support an 
inference that the complainant, by reason of the sexual nature of the 
complainant’s experience or conduct, is more likely to have consented, or less 
worthy of belief. 
 
The purpose of the limitation is to prevent evidence being tendered merely to 
create an inference. This is important because at common law this kind of 
inferential and propensity reasoning was allowed without restriction. Even 
after the 1989 amendment, where the test became one of relevancy, there 
were a number of cases that failed to properly refuse to admit evidence that 
generally pointed to an assumption of consent. The prejudice against women, 
who remain the majority of sexual offence complainants, has become so 
entrenched in our minds that it is often implemented as part of the law. 
 
This kind of inferential reasoning is not merely a cruel ordeal to which the 
complainant ought not to be subjected to, but more importantly for the 
purposes of the law, this sort of evidence presents nothing more than 
inference has very little probative value and is irrelevant. 
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Therefore, the purpose of the limitation is necessary to protect the rights of 
the complainant, and to promote the administration of justice, which does not 
extend to admitting irrelevant, prejudicial evidence. 
 
 
Section 36(1)(c): the nature and extent of the limitation 
 
It is submitted that the right to challenge evidence does not include raising 
new evidence which will not be adduced later at the stage of cross-
examination. If this is accepted as true, then it follows that the right to ask 
questions pertaining to a complainant’s prior sexual history during cross-
examination does not form part of the right to adduce and challenge evidence 
as contained in section 35(3)(i). 
 
The limitation caused by subsection (6), therefore, only extends as far as the 
adducing of evidence, and not cross-examination in so far as it aimed at 
eliciting new evidence. 
According to this reading of the subsection, the limitation extends only so far 
as rendering inadmissible evidence that only supports the inference 
contemplated in subsection (6) and serves no other purpose. 
 
This seems to be in keeping with the general rule that propensity and 
inferential reasoning is inadmissible. If there is any other valid reason for 
which the evidence is sought to be adduced or questioned, the judicial officer 
has the discretion to allow it. Thus, the exclusionary rule extends only so far 
as preventing evidence or questioning that has no purpose other than to 
create an inference as contemplated in subsection (6). 
 
 
Section 36(1)(d): the relation between the limitation and its 
purpose 
 
The limitation seeks to ensure that prior sexual history evidence that is aimed 
only at creating an inference as contemplated in subsection (6) is excluded. 
 73 
This is because the evidence it elicits is irrelevant and prejudicial to the 
complainant. 
 
Subsection (6) clearly seeks to prevent this kind of evidence from coming 
before the court. If properly implemented, section 227(6) will have the effect of 
protecting sexual offence complainants from dangerous inferential reasoning. 
 
The exclusionary rule is a necessary and legitimate formulation. It serves to 
emphasise that inferential reasoning is not ordinarily relevant, and seeks to 
ensure that it does not get admitted in sexual offence cases where its 
admission has been too easily allowed in the past. Unless the evidence is 
necessary for another reason, such as the circumstances outlined in 
subsection (5), it is submitted that when evidence is aimed only at supporting 
an inference that the complainant is more likely to have consented or is less 
worthy of belief, it should be excluded.240 
 
 
Section 36(1)(e): less restrictive means to achieve the purpose 
 
It could be argued that if subsection (6) were to be drafted differently, so as to 
avoid creating an exclusionary rule, it would achieve its purpose in a less 
restrictive means. 
However, the formulation of subsection (6) as it stands at present is 
necessary to ensure that evidence aimed only at creating an inference is 
excluded. This is because there is sufficient case law to suggest that 
determining the admissibility of this kind of evidence is tricky, and in the past, 
presiding officers have too easily allowed this sort of evidence, especially 
during cross-examination.241 Thus, it is necessary to ensure that the potential 
for discretion to be improperly exercised is curtailed. 
                                                 
240 Subject, of course, to the desire to avoid an innocent accused from a wrongful conviction. 
241 Temkin (note 54). 
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If subsection (6) were not drafted as an exclusionary rule, there is the danger 
that evidence that is aimed only at supporting an inference as contemplated in 
subsection (6) would be admitted, even where it served no other purpose. 
The purpose of section 227, which is to avoid just such a result, would be 
undone. 
 
 
8. Conclusion 
 
Rape shield laws serve a very important purpose in our law. Firstly, to offer 
some protection to a complainant in a sexual offence by reducing, to some 
extent, secondary victimisation and humiliation that encompasses the trial 
experience. This is a legitimate purpose and is necessary to protect the 
complainant’s constitutional rights to dignity242 and privacy.243 
 
In the recent case of S v Matyityi,244 the Supreme Court of Appeal 
emphasised the importance of adopting a more victim-centred approach 
across the criminal justice system.245 The protection of the complainant is a 
legitimate and important purpose which is foundational to the rationale 
underlying rape shield provisions. 
 
In a South African context, sexual offences are extremely prevalent. Yet, 
reporting rates are extremely low, a fact which can be partly attributed to 
various problems within the criminal justice system, including low rates of 
prosecutions of sexual offences, low conviction rates and a general lack of 
faith in the system. Another reason for the low rates of reporting is the stigma 
and humiliation that complainants experience throughout the process. 
 
Prior to the enactment of South Africa’s rape shield provision, the trauma that 
the complainant suffered during the trial was almost entirely disregarded. It 
                                                 
242 Section 10 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
243 Section 14 of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. 
244 (695/09) [2010] ZASCA 127 (30 September 2010). 
245 Supra note 244 at para 16. 
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has now become generally accepted that it is important to offer some 
protection to a complainant, even though in protecting the rights of the 
accused, complete protection cannot be offered to a complainant.246 The 
Court in the case of De Beer v The State,247 succinctly commented on the 
growing realization that the myths that are historically bound within the law, 
have to be thwarted: 
 
“Rape is a topic that abounds with myths and misconceptions. It is a 
serious social problem about which, fortunately, we are at last 
becoming concerned. The increasing attention given to it has raised 
our national consciousness about what is always and foremost an 
aggressive act. It is a violation that is invasive and dehumanising. The 
consequences for the rape victim are severe and permanent. For many 
rape victims the process of investigation and prosecution is almost as 
traumatic as the rape itself.”248 
 
Rape shield laws aim to prevent evidence that inherently raise these myths 
and prejudices from forming part of the evidence that a court draws on to 
reach a decision. The need to prevent, in particular, the gendered bias that 
forms part of our law through a history of prejudice cannot be 
overemphasised. 
 
There is another purpose that underlies the rationale for rape shield laws, that 
of ensuring that only relevant facts are placed before the court. Generally, 
evidence of prior sexual history is not directly relevant to proving the 
allegation. Such merely creates assumptions and ancillary issues, which 
detracts from the truth-finding mission of the court. 
 
The common law of evidence contains the general rules of relevance and 
admissibility. However, due to the history of prejudice aimed at rape 
complainants, these general rules are not successful in the area of sexual 
                                                 
246 S v Mothopeng & Others (1) 1979 (2) SA 180 (T). 
247 Stephen Bryan de Beer v The State (121/04) (Delivered on 12 November 2004) (Unreported 
judgment of the Supreme Court of Appeal). 
248 Supra note 247 at para 18. 
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offences. Section 227 serves the function of creating specific guidelines for 
the issue of prior sexual history evidence, to ensure that only sexual history 
evidence that is genuinely relevant will be admitted. 
 
This rationale is the most important in showing that section 227 does not 
unjustifiably limit the fair trial rights of the accused. The rights of the accused 
do not extend to being allowed to raise evidence that is irrelevant and 
inadmissible. To allow this in the context of sexual offences, but not for other 
offences, would be to favour certain groups of accused persons over others 
depending on the type of crime committed, which is illogical and legally 
incorrect.249 
 
The purposes of section 227 are necessary and legitimate. More importantly, 
the scope of section 35(3)(i), the right to adduce and challenge evidence, is 
not materially affected by section 227 because the right does not extend to 
irrelevant evidence. Section 227 is reasonable and justifiable and is, 
therefore, constitutional. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
249 Section 9(1) of the Constitution of South Africa, 1996. “Everyone is equal before the law and has 
the right to equal protection and benefit of the law.” 
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